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Abstract 
 
In chapter 1, we examine the nature and scale of the relationship between returns on sector 
Equity Traded Funds (ETFs) and their volatility. We discuss the source and direction of the 
effect between returns and risk and whether behavioral biases are prominent among sector ETFs. 
The study has implications for financial sector practitioners and investors, as it provides more 
information about the risk in sector ETF and whether that risk differs from that of other 
investment instruments. To this end, we test three hypotheses based on the relevant literature on 
volatility and returns: the leverage effect hypothesis, feedback hypothesis, and behavioral biases 
in assets pricing. We employ two measures of volatility in this chapter; specifically, we use the 
GARCH (1, 1) model and the Range-based autoregressive model.  
 
Chapter 2 presents an examination of the factors that affect payout policy in a frontier market. 
MSCI classifies the Saudi stock exchange as a large frontier market and proposes to be 
reclassified as an emerging market by next year. The Saudi market is characterized by the high 
governmental influence and dominance of individual traders on daily transactions. By studying 
the 12-year panel data, we assess the effect government, board characteristics, social norms and 
major shareholder on Saudi firms’ decision to distribute dividends. The government presence 
and investor taste, especially for Islamic-compliant firms, are discussed. This chapter provides 
valuable information for investors and practitioners by identifying the factors that should be 
considered when making finance and investment decisions in frontier markets.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Equity Traded Fund; Volatility; Corporate Governance; Government Ownership; 
Board Structure
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Chapter 1: The Returns–Volatility Relation in Sector Exchange Traded Funds 
 
1. Introduction 
The returns-risk (volatility as a proxy for risk) relation is one of the core tenets of the finance 
literature. The basic asset pricing models assume a positive risk-returns relation. However, there 
is a growing body of literature that challenges these foundations and provides explanations based 
on time-specific and behavioral biases that shape the risk-return relationship. Therefore, we use a 
sample of nine sectors’ ETFs over the course of sixteen years to determine how much the returns 
volatility relation in those special funds agrees with the positive risk-returns proposed by the 
theoretical models.  
ETFs represent a choice for individuals and institutions that seek cost-effective 
investment strategies and prefer to follow board market indices1. Within this 2.7 trillion-dollar 
industry worldwide, there are 1,411 funds in the US, representing 73% of ETF net asset in 2014.2 
The primary objective of the essay is to examine the nature and magnitude of the 
interrelationship between returns from sector ETFs and their volatility. More specifically, we 
will investigate how the past and current returns and volatility of sector ETFs affect each other.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Investment Company Institute 2015 Fact Book  
2 Investment Company Institute 2015 Fact Book 
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Figure 1 
 
The essay contributes to the existing literature by offering fresh evidence regarding the 
returns–volatility relationship. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the  
 
returns–volatility relationship by utilizing the data on popular ETFs representing the 
industrial mutual funds closely replicating the S&P Select Sector Indices.  
In this chapter, we provide a review of the literature regarding risk and return and the 
explanations of the existence of an asymmetric negative relationship of returns-volatility. Section 
3 describes the methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data used in 
the empirical models. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
73%
16%
8%
3%
Distribution of $2.7 Trillion ETF NAV 
United States Europe Africa & Asia-Pacific Other Americas
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2. Literature Review 
Return and risk are essential components in the finance literature. The Portfolio Selection Theory 
and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) assume a positive correlation between risk and return. 
Nevertheless, CAPM does not differentiate between an asset’s response to bullish and bearish 
market conditions. In other words, assets are exposed to risk factors equally during bull or bear 
markets, and investors respond to both upside and downside risk in a similar manner. However, 
there is now a growing body of literature approaching the issues mentioned above, and the 
resulting findings do not necessary confirm the basic pricing models assumptions.  In this 
section, we review the literature focusing on volatility and the nature of its relation to returns.  
Some papers within the extant literature investigate the existence and importance of bull 
and bear beta (Ang and Chen, 2002; Pedersen and Hwang, 2007; Hong et al., 2007; Galagedera, 
2009). For example, Bhaduri and Durai (2006) and Woodward and Anderson (2009) apply a dual 
beta model in their paper. Both papers employ a simple one-factor market model similar to that 
used in this paper. Yet other studies that investigate similar issues include Silvapulle et al. (2004) 
and Huang and Wu (2005). Using the data on the UK equity market, Pedersen and Hwang (2003) 
examine the significance of bear market beta and find that bear market beta might not be a major 
factor in determining asset pricing.  
Volatility plays an important role in asset pricing and risk management and other areas of 
finance. The volatility is usually categorized according to the method of calculation into implied 
and realized. The implied volatility, such as VIX, was introduced by the CBOE in 1993 to 
measure of market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by the S&P 500 stock index 
option prices3. Realized volatility, or historical volatility, is a nonparametric ex-post estimate of 
                                                          
3 CBOE VOLATILITY INDEX (VIX ) FUTURES. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://cfe.cboe.com/products/vx_qrg.pdf 
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the return variation. However, since there are different volatility measures, we chose the 
volatility measure that affects volatility-returns’ nature and strength (Becker et al., 2009). 
Therefore, two methods are employed in this paper, namely the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model (1, 1) and the Range-based autoregressive 
volatility (AV) model. GARCH is most often used method for modeling the time-varying 
conditional volatility due to its ﬂexible adaptation of the dynamics of volatilities and its ease of 
estimation when compared to other models.   
The AV model, the second method used in this essay, utilizes a range-based volatility 
measure (Parkinson, 1980) of the difference between the highest and lowest log prices over a 
ﬁxed sampling interval. The range-based volatility estimators are claimed to be more efﬁcient 
than other realized volatility measures (Parkinson, 1980; Garman and Klass, 1980). The AV 
model was introduced by Hsieh (1995), who shows that AV has much less volatility persistence 
than the GARCH model and AV does not require any distributional assumptions. GARCH 
requires a specific distributional assumption on the error term. By accurately modeling the range-
based volatility, it can provide superior performance in estimating volatility (Chou, 2005). Li and 
Hong (2011) use two types of volatility models: the return-based GARCH model and the range-
based AV model. The results from both the in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts demonstrate 
that the AV model successfully captures the dynamics of the volatility and offers good 
performance compared to the GARCH model. 
In contrast to the assets pricing models, the asymmetric negative relation between returns 
and volatility are documented by many empirical papers. Three theories attempt to explain this 
finding. First, the leverage hypothesis (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982) attributed the negative return 
to the high debt-to-equity ratio of firms, which makes them riskier and causes greater volatility 
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among their stock prices. Second, volatility feedback hypothesis (Poterba and Summers, 1986; 
Campbell and Hentschel, 1992) states that the current price to increase (decline) responds to 
time-varying risk premium (conditional volatility). The third theory is related to behavioral 
explanations that deal with market participants’ cognitive biases and risk aversion behaviors. 
Several studies attribute the negative asymmetric return-volatility to behavioral explanation such 
as representation and extrapolation (Badshah, 2013; Low 2004; Hibbert et al., 2008). Hibbert et 
al. (2008) provide behavioral explanations for this asymmetric relation and conclude that 
behavioral theory is better than leverage and feedback theories in explaining volatility-returns 
relations. Low (2004) also finds a symmetric downward‐sloping S‐curve volatility-return. In 
general, the behavioral concepts associate a substantial downward movement in asset prices with 
the fear of risk and a significant upward trend in prices with exuberance.4 
Lin and Chiang (2005) use a sample of forty-nine Taiwan firms in 2003 and employ the 
method used by Andersen et al. (2001) and GARCH (1, 1) within their study. They show that the 
volatility of the underlying stocks of electronic and the financial sector increases after trading 
ETF, while the opposite occurs in many stocks in other sectors. Trainor (2012) uses the monthly 
actual return value weighted index from 1926 to 2009 as the market proxy and the 30-day 
Treasury bill rate as the risk-free rate. He runs a regression of excess returns for each beta 
portfolio on the actual beta. The result reveals that high beta portfolios underperform those of 
low beta in a high volatility market during an extended period of time. Dheeriya, Rezayat, and 
Yavas (2014) perform a study of 223 days of data for daily return country-specific ETFs between 
2011 and 2012, employing Multivariate Auto Regressive Moving Average (MARMA). They 
report a significant co-movement of returns among all ETFs and the existence of transmission 
                                                          
4 Padungsaksawasdi, C. and Daigler, R. (2014). The Return-implied volatility Relation for commodity ETFs.  The Journal of Futures Markets. 34(3). 261–281 
 
6 
 
and persistence of volatilities within most emerging markets, except for Turkey and Russia. 
Milonas and Rompotis (2010) examine thirty-six Swiss ETFs from 2001 to 2006 by regressing 
the raw return of the tracking index portfolio. They find that performance of Swiss ETFs lower 
than their underlying indexes and their investors are subject to a greater risk. 
Daigler, Hibbert, and Pavlova (2014) use the daily return of Euro Exchange ETFs (FXE 
ETFs) in their study and its implied volatility EVZ and market implied volatility (VIX) from 
2007 to 2011. They run regressions on the euro-currency exchange-traded fund (FXE) and its 
associated option implied volatility index (the EVZ) and find that the euro return-volatility can 
be asymmetrically positive or have a negative relation. Chen and Huang (2010) employ 
GARCH-ARMA for the daily samples of nine stock market indexes and nine associated ETFs. 
They find that a strong negative asymmetric volatility affects all markets and bilateral spillover 
between returns for stock indexes and ETFs. Whaley (2009) uses VIX from 1986 to 2008 to 
regress the rate of the change of the S&P 500 portfolio with a dummy if the daily rate of change 
of the VIX is negative. He concludes that volatility and return has asymmetric negative relation. 
Padungsaksawasdi and Daigler (2014) use daily and intraday ETFs stock and index VIX data 
from 2008 to 2012. They employ all four models (Hibbert et al., 2008; Fleming et al., 1995; 
Low, 2004). They find that the market comovement between the price changes of the commodity 
ETFs and their option VIX changes is substantially weaker than the corresponding results for 
stock indexes. Badshah (2013) uses a quantile regression and the heterogeneity-consistent 
method proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) to examine the relation between stock index 
returns and changes in the implied volatility from 2001 to 2010. He finds a negative and 
asymmetric volatility relationship between each volatility index and its stock market index. He 
also shows that the quantile regression outperformed the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 
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which underestimates negative and asymmetric volatility relations. Krause (2012) uses daily 
ETFs and component stock options and associated implied volatility from 2005 to 2011 and find 
that firm-level options volatility is affected more by industry-level volatility than market 
volatility. Hassan et al. (2016) find that Islamic ETFs and commodity ETFs in Borsa Istanbul 
have an asymmetric relation running from positive return shocks to negative volatility shocks. 
In summary, the literature has produced results that contradict the underlying volatility-
return assumption in CAPM and MPT using different models and methods. Against this 
background, this study will add to the relevant literature by providing fresh evidence and 
extended time-series data. Also, this work is unique in the sense that it utilizes the ETF data 
instead of open-ended mutual funds data. ETFs are traded throughout the day in the market, 
providing investors a chance to react according to the market conditions. 
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3. Methodology 
The central research question in this essay relates to the existence and nature of the relationship 
between returns and volatility among the sector ETFs.  
3.1 Research Questions 
First, do returns and volatility in our sample have a unidirectional or bi-directional 
relationship? 
Second, what is the nature of their relationship – positive or inverse?  
Third, do they have a symmetric or asymmetric relationship? 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
The hypotheses of this essay are based on the literature review and the research questions 
listed above. In this paper, we test the following hypotheses based on the review of relevant 
literature that attempts to explain the volatility returns relation. 
3.2.1. The leverage effect hypothesis 
Black (1976) and Christie (1982) postulate that returns cause volatility through the 
leverage effect. According to their argument, a reduction in the market price of a financial asset 
leads to a decline in the firm value and raises the firm leverage ratio, which increases the 
leveraged firms’ risk and triggers higher changes in volatility. Following this argument, we 
specify the following hypothesis to test the leverage effect. 
H0: Returns do not affect volatility (i.e. there is no leverage effect)  
H1: Returns do affect volatility (i.e. there is a leverage effect) 
If we reject the null hypothesis, then the returns affect the volatility, which is in line with 
the work of Black (1976) and Chirstie (1982). If the underlying assets of ETFs are composed of 
many leveraged firms, then we find evidence in favor of the leverage effect.  
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3.2.2. The feedback effect hypothesis 
According to the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964), volatility determines the returns of the financial 
assets. As explained in Bekaert and Wu (2000, p.7): 
“For firms with high systematic risk, marketwide shocks may significantly increase their 
conditional covariance with the market. The resulting higher required return then leads to a 
volatility feedback effect on the conditional volatility, which would be absent or weaker for 
firms less sensitive to market level shocks.”   
In line with this argument, we test whether the sector ETFs in our sample face any 
feedback effect. In particular, we specify the following hypothesis:    
H0: Volatility does not affect returns (i.e. no feedback effect)  
H1: Volatility does affect returns (i.e. there is a feedback effect) 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, we will find support for the feedback hypothesis in our 
sample.  
3.2.3. Behavioral Hypothesis:  
Behavioral-based explanations link the existence of the negative asymmetric return-
volatility relationship to biases such as representativeness, affect, and the extrapolation 
(Badshah, 2013; Low, 2004; Giot, 2005; Hibbert et al., 2008). According to Low (2004), the fear 
of risk causes a considerable downward movement in asset prices following selloffs by irrational 
investors. At the same time, rational investors attempt to make profits from this downward trend, 
causing a subsequent rise in prices. This downward and upward movement in prices result in 
high volatility within the asset prices. To test this possibility in our data, we specify the 
following hypotheses: 
 H0: There is no asymmetric relationship between returns and volatility 
10 
 
 H1: There is an asymmetric negative relationship between returns and volatility  
The rejection of the null hypothesis will provide support in favor of behavioral biases in 
our sample. 
The continuously compounded daily return on each ETF is calculated as  
𝑅𝑡 = ln 𝑃𝑡 − ln 𝑃𝑡−1 (1) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the daily closing price adjusted for any dividends and splits and 𝑃𝑡−1 is the 
adjusted closing price in the previous trading day. 
We begin with the following specification for measuring the volatility of returns, which is 
simply the GARCH (1, 1) process proposed by Bollerslev (1986):  
                        𝑅𝑡 = σ𝑒𝑡      𝑒𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0,1) (2A) 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛾 + 𝛼 𝑅𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2  (2B) 
where returns 𝑅𝑡 is modeled as a zero-mean process and 𝜎𝑡
2 is a measure of the 
conditional volatility. A particular problem with the GARCH (1, 1) model is that it generates a 
measure of volatility that is persistent.  
We estimate the volatility of each ETF based on the range of high and low prices within a 
given day. This measure is simple to construct and has been shown to be very efficient in 
overcoming market microstructure-related biases of a volatility measure that is based on high-
frequency intraday returns (Alizadeh et al., 2002). We also use the following range-based 
estimator of daily volatility suggested by Parkinson (1980) and used in Li and Hong (2011), 
?̂?𝑡
2 = (
1
4
ln 2) (ln 𝐻𝑡 − ln 𝐿𝑡)
2 (3) 
where 𝐻𝑡 and 𝐿𝑡 are daily high and low prices, respectively. This measure is static in 
nature and does not incorporate the dynamic evolution of volatility in the financial markets. 
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Following Hsieh (1993) and as used in Li and Hong (2011), we specify the dynamic counterpart 
of the above specification as 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝜎𝑒𝑡      𝑒𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0,1) (4A) 
ln ?̂?𝑡
2 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑙𝑛 ?̂?𝑡−1
2 + 𝑣𝑡        𝑣𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0, 𝜎𝑣
2 ) (4B) 
 
Next, we will address the first research question, which inquires regarding the 
interrelationship between ETF returns and volatility. This issue is handled within the framework 
of Granger Causality. For each ETF, we specify a trivariate vector autoregression (VAR) in 
returns, 𝑅𝑡, own volatility, ?̂?𝑡
2, and the market volatility, ?̂?𝑀,𝑡
2  (which is used as a control variable): 
?̂?𝑡
2 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖 𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 ?̂?𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝛿1𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1 ?̂?𝑀,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑒1,𝑡  (5) 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖 𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 ?̂?𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝛿2𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1 ?̂?𝑀,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑒2,𝑡  (6) 
?̂?𝑀,𝑡
2 = 𝛼3 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑖 𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾3𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 ?̂?𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝛿3𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1 ?̂?𝑀,𝑡−1
2 +𝑒3,𝑡  (7) 
 
where p, q, and s are the optimal lag length of ETF returns, its volatility, and market 
volatility, respectively. The optimal lag is selected based on the Swartz Bayesian Information 
Criterion (SBIC). The focus of the essay is in the first two equations in the VAR system, based on 
which the Granger causality tests will be carried out.  
Leverage effect: 
In particular, the null hypothesis that past returns do not Granger cause future volatility can 
be expressed as in Equation 5: 
𝐻0: 𝛽11 = 𝛽12 = ⋯ = 𝛽1𝑝 = 0 
A rejection of the null hypothesis will indicate evidence of Granger causality running from 
returns to volatility, which would support the leverage effects.  
12 
 
On the other hand, the null hypothesis that the past volatility does not Granger cause the 
future returns can be written as in Equation 6: 
𝐻0: 𝛾21 = 𝛾22 = ⋯ = 𝛾2𝑞 = 0 
Again, a rejection of the null hypothesis will provide evidence of the influence of past 
volatility on the future returns on the ETFs for the feedback effects hypothesis.  
 
The existing literature also documents the presence of an asymmetric relationship 
between volatility and returns. Following Low (2004) and Padungsakswasdi and Daigler (2014), 
we specify an asymmetric model to study the presence of an asymmetric relationship between 
sector ETFs’ volatility and contemporaneous returns. The presence of asymmetric relations 
between these two variables is examined using the following specification: 
?̂?𝑡
2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑅𝑡
2 + 𝑒 𝑡  (8) 
where the variables are as defined before, and an additional variable, 𝑅𝑡
2, is added to test 
the presence of asymmetry. A significant and negative coefficient, 𝛾, provides support in favor 
of the asymmetric and negative relation between changes in the volatility and contemporaneous 
returns supporting the behavioral biases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
4. The Data 
This essay utilizes the sector ETFs managed by the State Street Global Advisers, commonly 
known as the SPDRs5. These sector ETFs follow the corresponding S&P Select Sector Indexes 
designed and managed by S&P Dow Jones Indices6. The details of the ETFs used in this study 
are given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: List of Sector Exchange Traded Funds 
Sector Fund Name Ticker Benchmark Inception Date 
The Materials Select Sector SPDR Fund XLB IXB 12/15/1998 
The Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund XLE IXE 12/16/1998 
The Financial Select Sector SPDR Fund XLF IXM 12/16/1998 
The Industrial Select Sector SPDR Fund XLI IXI 12/15/1998 
The Technology Select Sector SPDR Fund XLK IXT 12/15/1998 
The Consumer Staples Select Sector SPDR Fund XLP IXR 12/16/1998 
The Utilities Select Sector SPDR Fund XLU IXU 12/15/1998 
The Health Care Select Sector SPDR Fund XLV IXV 12/15/1998 
The Consumer Discretionary Select Sector SPDR Fund XLY IXY 12/16/1998 
The SPDR S&P 500 Fund SPY SPTR 1/22/1993 
This table shows the official name, the ticker, the benchmark that sector ETF seeks to track inception date 
of each sector ETF. 
 
The return data on nine select sector SPRD ETFs are obtained from Yahoo Finance. For 
the overall US equity market representation, we use the ETFs based on the S&P 500, for which 
the data are collected from Yahoo Finance.  
                                                          
5For information on these funds, visit http://www.sectorspdr.com/sectorspdr/ 
6 For more information on these sector indices, visit http://us.spindices.com/index–family/us–equity/sector–industry 
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The period of investigation is from December 1998 to June 2017. The long span of the 
time series data in our sample enables us to investigate the responses of the sector ETFs and thus 
to reveal the relation between their returns versus their own volatility and market volatility. 
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5. Result Discussion 
In this section, we explain the results found in this paper. Instead of using each ETF’s full 
official name, we will use the sector name whenever we refer to the ETFs (i.e. energy for the 
Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund). Figure A.2 in the appendix shows each ETF’s market 
volatility in Panel A and price and the returns in Panel B since 2000.  
The descriptive statistics of the daily returns are presented in Table 2. The average 
returns for the materials, energy, industrial, and consumer discretionary select sector are the 
highest (0.0003), and the lowest is found in the utilities and health select sector (0.0001). The 
standard deviation, a measure of volatility in returns, is highest in the health select sector 
(0.1254), and the smallest was in the consumer staples select sector. None of the sector ETFs has 
negative average returns. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Returns 
Ticker Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
XLB 4649 0.0003 0.0155 -0.1325 0.1315 
XLE 4649 0.0003 0.0174 -0.1560 0.1525 
XLF 4649 0.0002 0.0202 -0.1907 0.2730 
XLI 4233 0.0003 0.0141 -0.0986 0.1015 
XLK 4649 0.0002 0.0164 -0.0905 0.1493 
XLP 4649 0.0002 0.0096 -0.0621 0.0666 
XLU 4233 0.0001 0.0122 -0.0891 0.1140 
XLV 4236 0.0001 0.1254 -1.2270 1.2589 
XLY 4649 0.0003 0.0142 -0.1236 0.0933 
SPY 4650 0.0002 0.0123 -0.1036 0.1356 
This table shows the summary statistics for each sector ETF. Ticker, observations, mean returns, standard 
deviation of returns, minimum and maximum returns are shown respectively in the table. The numbers of 
observations differ because some of the trading day’s data were unavailable on June 16th, 2017, for some 
ETFs according to Yahoo Finance. 
 
The correlation coefficients of daily returns are reported in the Appendix (Table A.1). 
Focusing on each fund’s correlation with the overall market in the daily data, represented by 
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SPY (the SPDR S&P500 ETF), we find that the industrial and technology select sectors are the 
highest, at 0.84 and 0.82, respectively. The health care select sector’s ETFs have the lowest 
(0.04) correlation with the overall market returns. The highest correlation between two ETFs is 
0.7 between the consumer discretionary and health care select sectors, followed by the 
correlation between the industrial and financial sectors’ ETF. The lowest correlation between 
two ETFs is that between the consumer staples and healthcare select sectors. The correlation 
coefficients for daily volatility among ETFs are also reported in the Appendix. The industrial 
sector ETFs have the highest correlation with the overall market volatility (0.865). We find that 
the utility ETFs’ volatility is negatively correlated with the overall market. It also has a negative 
correlation regarding volatility among the healthcare, consumer staples, technology, and energy 
sectors. The highest correlation between two ETFs’ volatility is between those of the financial 
and consumer discretionary sectors (0.835).  
Data that exhibit Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and volatility 
clustering can be represented by a GARCH model, provided that it uses stationary data. We run 
an ARCH effect test on each ETF and conclude that there is an ARCH effect in all sector ETFs. 
Upon inspecting the time series plot for each sector’s ETFs (Figure A.1 in the Appendix), we 
determine that there is apparent volatility clustering. The GARCH is popular for modeling the 
volatility clustering that is visible during the high volatility period that are followed by high 
volatility, and low volatility times that are followed by low volatility. However, the GARCH 
model suffers from the volatility persistence that at times reaches 0.99, as documented by several 
papers. The range-based volatility AV model, suggested by Li and Hong (2011), show 
demonstrates less persistence than GARCH models. The visual inspection can provide a general 
idea about the data at hand, but it is not sufficient when a specific assessment is needed. 
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Therefore, these issues and many others are tested, and the findings are reported in this section of 
the paper. 
We test the return and volatility variables for stationarity. For a variable to be stationary, 
the null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root must be rejected. We test the return and 
volatility variables for stationarity. For a variable to be stationary, the null hypothesis that the 
variable contains a unit root must be rejected. We find that all ETFs’ return series are stationary, 
as are all volatility series. 
 
Table 3: Data Stationarity 
Data Stationarity: H0: The variable contains a unit root 
   Returns  Volatility  
ETFs  
Test 
Stat 
Crit. 
Val. 
P–Val Decision  
Test 
Stat 
Crit. 
Val. 
P–Val Decision 
XLB  -19.71 -3.43 0.000 Reject  -5.91 -3.43 0.000 Reject 
XLE  -19.41 -3.43 0.000 Reject  -6.22 -3.43 0.000 Reject 
XLF  -19.88 -3.43 0.000 Reject   -4.69 -3.43 0.000 Reject 
XLI  -18.49 -3.43 0.000 Reject  -9.84 -3.43 0.000 Reject 
XLK  -18.81 -3.43 0.000 Reject  -4.04 -3.43 0.001 Reject  
XLP  -19.28 -3.43 0.000 Reject  -5.09 -3.43 0.000 Reject 
XLU  -18.93 -3.43 0.000 Reject  -6.31 -3.43 0.000 Reject 
XLV  -26.61 -3.43 0.000 Reject  -6.45 -3.43 0.000 Reject 
XLY   -19.15 -3.43 0.000 Reject   -4.61 -3.43 0.001 Reject 
All ETFs’ returns series and volatility series are stationary. Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) was used to 
test the existence of unit-root with null hypothesis Random walk without drift, and the alternative is that 
the variable was generated by a stationary process. The reported P-value is MacKinnon approximate p-
value for the test statistics. ADF critical values are -3.43, -2.86, and -2.57 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
The table below shows a comparison between the two employed methods, the GARCH 
(1,1) and AV models, in terms of the magnitude of autocorrelation and the joint test of lag 
significance.  
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Table 4: Diagnostic Tests of Models 
  GARCH (1,1) 
ETFs  ACF(1) ACF(3) ACF(6) Q(1) Q(3) Q(6) β 
XLB  0.9855 0.9577 0.9175 4116.3* 12023* 23053* .907 
XLE  0.9736 0.9748 0.9453 3757* 11101* 21597* .919 
XLF  0.9725 0.9036 0.8270 3615* 10091* 18403* .789 
XLI  0.9852 0.9598 0.9171 3711* 10866* 20827* .917 
XLK  0.9888 0.9681 0.9299 3738* 10988* 21338* .920 
XLP  0.9833 0.9469 0.8979 3696* 10697* 20283* .905 
XLU  0.9790 0.9339 0.8716 3664* 10507* 19679* .890 
XLV  0.9731 0.9076 0.7870 3619* 10195* 18052* .686 
XLY  0.9895 0.9712 0.9454 3743* 11025* 21492*  .923 
  AV Model 
ETFs 
 
ACF(1) ACF(3) ACF(6) Q(1) Q(3) Q(6) ∑ 𝛽 
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
XLB  0.5372 0.3068 0.4196 1223* 1774.7* 3870.3* .900 
XLE  0.5115 0.3502 0.472 1108.8* 2056.4* 4198.8* .885 
XLF  0.4355 0.2627 0.3061 803.68* 1398.1* 2325.4* .928 
XLI  0.1476 0.0948 0.089 92.276* 208.34* 352.73* .328 
XLK  0.3937 0.19 0.2863 656.99* 1052.3* 1774.8* .943 
XLP  0.4022 0.295 0.3464 685.66* 1323.2* 2401.5* .912 
XLU  0.4531 0.2714 0.2984 870.07* 1453.3* 2425.5* .861 
XLV  0.3975 0.2814 0.2674 669.78* 1220.7* 2073.8* .880 
XLY  0.4778 0.3324 0.4317 967.47* 1831* 3479.6* .917 
The table shows a comparison between the two employed methods, the GARCH (1,1) and AV models, in 
terms of the magnitude of autocorrelation and the joint test of lag significance. ACF is the autocorrelation 
function, and under Q is the λ2 of the test statistics of the Q test of the variable’s own lag significance. 1, 3, 
and 6 indicate lag 1, lag 3, and lag 6, respectively. An asterisk * indicates significance level at 1%. 
 
The above table shows the magnitude of autocorrelation function at the first, third, and 
sixth lag. The AV’s lags are less than that of GARCH (1, 1). In addition, the rate of decay in 
autocorrelation is faster under the AV model than the GARCH. The null hypothesis of the joint 
Q test of lags is that there is no autocorrelation. The first, third, and sixth lags’ Q statistics are 
reported, and they are all significant at the 1% level. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows a 
graphical representation of ETFs’ returns autocorrelation and partial correlation function. 
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We used one of the common optimum lag methods, which are Schwarz's Bayesian 
Information Criterion (SBIC). Table 5 shows the optimum lags for each ETF under both models. 
Most of the sector ETFs’ volatilities are affected by their own volatility for about twelve trading 
days. Energy and consumer stables and healthcare ETFs have the highest number of lags under 
the GARCH and AV models. 
 
Using each ETF’s optimum lag, as discussed in the preceding section, Table 5 presents 
the result of the Granger causality to test the first hypothesis regarding the returns–volatility 
relation. 
 
Table 5: Granger Causality Tests for returns 
𝑯𝟎: 𝑹𝒕 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 ?̂?𝒕
𝟐 
  GARCH(1,1)  AV model 
ETFs  χ2 Lag p–value Decision  χ2 Lag p–value Decision 
XLB  194.88 13 0.000 Reject  209.16 11 0.000 Reject 
XLE  412.45 21 0.000 Reject  260.36 11 0.000 Reject 
XLF  179.01 12 0.000 Reject   183.81 12 0.000 Reject 
XLI  277.85 12 0.000 Reject  909.16 11 0.000 Reject 
XLK  299.54 12 0.000 Reject  302.04 12 0.000 Reject  
XLP  210.18 15 0.000 Reject  175.44 12 0.000 Reject 
XLU  384.37 12 0.000 Reject  152.45 11 0.000 Reject 
XLV  343.69 20 0.000 Reject  103.55 13 0.000 Reject 
XLY  209.18 13 0.000 Reject  201.91 12 0.000 Reject 
The table shows a result of the two models GARCH (1,1) and AV models using the VAR framework and 
Granger causality to test the direction of the effect between each ETF’s returns and its own volatility with 
market volatility being a control variable. λ2 is a Granger causality Wald test statistic. Lag is the optimum 
lag of each ETF based on the SBIC criteria. The decision shows Reject or Fail to indicate whether we reject 
the null hypothesis in the top row of the table or not.  
 
H0: Returns do not affect volatility (i.e. there is no leverage effect)  
H1: Returns affect volatility (i.e. there is a leverage effect) 
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At the 10% significance level, we can reject the null for all ETFs in both models. The 
above hypothesis reveals important results that the daily returns Granger cause its volatility. This 
is evidence that the leverage effect in sector ETFs runs from price to volatility. 
 
Table 6: Granger Causality Tests for Volatility 
𝑯𝟎: ?̂?𝒕
𝟐 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝑹𝒕 
  GARCH(1,1)  AV model 
ETFs  χ2 Lag p–value Decision  χ2 Lag p–value Decision 
XLB  26.97 13 0.013 Reject  9.61 11 0.565 Fail 
XLE  166.13 21 0.000 Reject  13.33 11 0.272 Fail 
XLF  26.60 12 0.009 Reject  17.94 12 0.117 Fail  
XLI  48.30 12 0.000 Reject  14.55 11 0.204 Fail 
XLK  60.15 12 0.000 Reject  23.86 12 0.021 Fail 
XLP  45.84 15 0.000 Reject  12.24 12 0.426 Fail  
XLU  40.37 12 0.000 Reject  7.35 11 0.770 Fail 
XLV  189.45 20 0.000 Reject  12.99 13 0.448 Fail 
XLY  91.97 13 0.000 Reject  13.31 12 0.347 Fail 
The table shows the result of the two models, GARCH (1,1) and AV models, using a VAR framework and 
Granger causality to test the direction of effect between each ETF’s returns and its own volatility, with 
market volatility being a control variable. λ2 is a Granger causality Wald test statistic. Lag is the optimum 
lag of each ETF based on SBIC criteria. The decision field indicates Reject or Fail to represent whether we 
reject the null hypothesis in the top row of the table or not.  
 
H0: Volatility does not affect returns (i.e. there is no feedback effect)  
H1: Volatility does affect returns (i.e. there is a feedback effect) 
Here, each model gives us different results. The AV model gives consistent results. With 
the AV model, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that volatility does not affect returns. Using 
the AV model, in the preceding section, we also accept that the returns affect volatility. 
Therefore, the AV model gives evidence for the leverage effect and against the feedback effect. 
On the other hand, the GARCH results show some inconsistency. It indicates the bidirectional 
relation between returns volatility. Thus, the result of the GARCH model supports the claim that 
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leverage and feedback effects coexist in sector ETFs. Since the AV model of volatility gives 
consistent results, it seems more appropriate for our data based on the diagnostic results. 
Therefore, we rely on the result from the AV model to explain the relationship between returns 
and volatility.  
The main point we can glean from testing the above two hypotheses is that the AV model 
gives us consistent results, which may indicate its suitability for our data and its superior 
performance.   
Table 7 below shows the results that test the specification (8) for an asymmetric model to 
study the presence of an asymmetric relationship between sector ETFs volatility and 
contemporaneous returns.  
 
Table 7: Volatility-Asymmetric Returns Relationship 
 
 GARCH(1,1)  AV Model 
ETFs  α Rt Rt2 Adj. R2  α Rt Rt2 Adj. R2 
XLB  0.0002  
(0.000) 
 
-0.0001  
(0.668) 
 
0.1790 
(0.000) 
 
0.174  0.0000 
(0.000) 
0.0000 
(0.214) 
 
0.0565 
(0.000) 
 
0.230 
XLE  0.0002  
(0.000) 
 
0.0014  
(0.000) 
 
0.2230 
 (0.000) 
 
0.226  0.0000 
(0.000) 
0.0004 
(0.000) 
0.0598 
(0.000) 
 
0.293 
XLF  0.0004  
(0.000) 
 
-0.0029  
(0.001) 
 
0.1680 
 (0.000) 
 
0.094  0.0000 
(0.000) 
-0.0002 
(0.000) 
 
0.0249 
(0.000) 
 
0.127 
XLI  0.0001  
(0.000) 
 
0.0005  
(0.011) 
 
0.1680 
 (0.000) 
 
0.154  0.0000 
(0.000) 
0.0000 
(0.464) 
 
0.0009 
(0.000) 
 
0.065 
XLK  0.0002  
(0.000) 
 
-0.0012  
(0.000) 
 
0.1870 
 (0.000) 
 
0.173  0.0000 
(0.000) 
-0.0002 
(0.002) 
 
0.0559 
(0.000) 
 
0.226 
XLP  0.0000  
(0.000) 
 
0.0002  
(0.057) 
 
0.1530 
 (0.000) 
 
0.138  -10.961 
(0.000) 
0.0000 
(0.580) 
 
0.0609 
(0.000) 
 
0.138 
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XLU  0.0001  
(0.000) 
 
-0.0000  
(0.901) 
 
0.2000 
 (0.000) 
 
0.185  -9.736 
(0.000) 
-0.0001 
(0.457) 
 
0.1220 
(0.000) 
 
0.135 
XLV  0.0134  
(0.000) 
 
-0.0601  
(0.000) 
 
0.3660 
 (0.000) 
 
0.205  -9.911 
(0.000) 
-0.0000 
(0.845) 
 
-0.0000 
(0.003) 
 
0.006 
XLY  0.0001  
(0.000) 
 
0.0008  
(0.001) 
 
0.1990 
 (0.000) 
 
0.188  -10.501 
(0.000) 
0.0001 
(0.058) 
0.0670 
(0.000) 
 
0.162 
The table shows the results of returns asymmetric model (8) to test the asymmetric relationship between 
sector ETFs’ volatility and contemporaneous returns. α is the intercept, Rt is the contemporaneous returns, 
and Rt2 is the squared returns. A negative and significant Rt2 coefficient is an indication of behavioral biases 
in the sector ETFs’ trading. 
 
The GARCH result shows that all sector ETFs have a significant contemporaneous 
returns coefficient, with the exception of the material sector ETF. However, the sign 
contemporaneous returns are different among the five sector ETFs. Regarding the asymmetric 
relation between volatility and returns, the GARCH model produces significant R2s coefficients, 
but with an opposite sign than what has been documented in the literature.   
The AV model produces insignificant contemporaneous returns among the five sector 
ETFs. R2’s coefficients in the AV model are significant, but only the healthcare sector ETF is 
negative as expected. The positive asymmetric relation in the sector ETFs provides a puzzle, and, 
therefore, we tend to believe that there is not enough evidence for behavioral biases in sector 
ETFs.  
We run the same tests on the weekly data of the returns and volatility of sector ETFs. We 
do not report the tables here to maintain brevity. However, we include the tables in the Appendix 
for interested readers. Weekly data give the same results as the daily data, with the exception of 
two changes. First, under the AV model, we do not find support for leverage or feedback 
hypothesis in the technology sector. Second, the GARCH model results are more consistent with 
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the weekly data than  with the daily data, since we find support for the feedback effect after 
rejecting the leverage effect in the energy, financial, and utility sector ETFs.  
The outcome of this section shows that there is support for the leverage effect in our 
sample. Also, our sample does not support the feedback hypothesis. Additionally, we do not find 
enough evidence for the behavioral explanation of return and volatility relation among sector 
ETFs.  
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter summarizes the discussion and the result of the relationship between returns and 
volatility in a sample of nine sector ETFs that are based on the S&P500 industrial sector indexes. 
Using daily data for the period from December 1998 to June 2017, we study the nature of the 
relationship between the returns on these ETFs and their volatility. In this connection, we specify 
three different hypotheses based on the relevant literature that focuses on the returns volatility 
relationship. These hypotheses explained in the text in details.  
Two measures of volatility are used in this essay. The first measure is based on the 
popular GARCH (1, 1) specification. A particular problem with this measure of volatility is that 
it is generally highly persistent, which is evident in our data as well. As an alternative measure of 
volatility, which is less persistent than that under GARCH (1, 1), we utilize the Autoregressive 
Volatility (AV) model.  
When testing the first two hypotheses, we use the VAR framework and the Grander 
causality test. The results obtained in our paper support the leverage effect hypothesis regarding 
both measures of volatility. On the other hand, when testing the feedback hypothesis, we get 
different results based on the two different measures of volatility. However, as noted in the text, 
the AV model of volatility is more appropriate for our data based on the diagnostic results. So, 
for the feedback hypothesis, we rely on the result from the AV model and conclude that there is 
no feedback effect in our sample.  
The third hypothesis of our paper is related to the existence of behavioral biases in our 
data. To test this hypothesis, we specify an asymmetric model. The results obtained from both 
measures of volatility are very similar. Although we find the asymmetric terms to be significant, 
they are not as negative as expected under the behavioral explanations in the literature. 
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Therefore, we tend to believe that the behavioral biases do not explain the relationship of returns 
and volatility in the sector ETFs.  
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8. APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1: Correlation Coefficients for Returns 
 
XLB XLE XLF XLI XLK XLP XLU XLV XLY SPY 
XLB 1 
         
XLE 0.688 1 
        
XLF 0.636 0.532 1 
       
XLI 0.735 0.572 0.682 1 
      
XLK 0.558 0.454 0.586 0.674 1 
     
XLP 0.530 0.461 0.546 0.563 0.427 1 
    
XLU 0.506 0.541 0.480 0.517 0.445 0.540 1 
   
XLV 0.037 0.032 0.038 0.057 0.031 0.022 0.027 1 
  
XLY 0.698 0.533 0.726 0.762 0.683 0.607 0.501 0.03 1 
 
SPY 0.758 0.685 0.797 0.820 0.839 0.668 0.629 0.040 0.840 1 
 
 
Table A.2: Correlation Coefficients for Volatility 
 XLB XLE XLF XLI XLK XLP XLU XLV XLY SPY 
XLB 1          
XLE 0.758 1         
XLF 0.648 0.590 1        
XLI 0.816 0.732 0.675 1       
XLK 0.563 0.483 0.461 0.634 1      
XLP 0.717 0.714 0.568 0.748 0.616 1     
XLU 0.007 –0.006 0.047 0.019 –0.167 –0.075 1    
XLV 0.723 0.691 0.577 0.768 0.675 0.771 –0.038 1   
XLY 0.790 0.753 0.693 0.835 0.617 0.796 0.001 0.750 1  
SPY 0.824 0.774 0.681 0.865 0.670 0.762 –0.004 0.800 0.821 1 
 
 
Table A.3: ARCH Effect and Disturbance Term Serial Correlation Tests 
    H0: no ARCH effect   H0: no serial correlation 
ETFs  
 
Lag p–value Decision  
 
Lag p–value Decision 
XLB  130.59 1 0.000 Reject  2.65 1 0.103 Fail 
XLE  165.00 1 0.000 Reject  14.16 1 0.000 Reject 
XLF  293.65 1 0.000 Reject   46.87 1 0.000 Reject 
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XLI  58.85 1 0.000 Reject  1.822 1 0.177 Fail 
XLK  140.78 1 0.000 Reject  5.149 1 0.023 Reject  
XLP  193.25 1 0.000 Reject  16.70 1 0.000 Reject 
XLU  318.69 1 0.000 Reject  24.08 1 0.000 Reject 
XLV  565.01 1 0.000 Reject  543.04 1 0.000 Reject 
XLY   159.26 1 0.000 Reject   0.224 1 0.6363 Fail 
 
 
Table A.4: Weekly Data: Granger Causality Tests for Returns 
𝑯𝟎: 𝑫𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝑹𝒕 𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 ?̂?𝒕
𝟐? 
  GARCH(1,1)  AV model 
ETFs  χ2 Lag p–value Decision  χ2 Lag p–value Decision 
XLB  114.06 3 0.000 Reject  49.23 3 0.000 Reject 
XLE  133.11 3 0.000 Reject  6.15 3 0.013 Reject 
XLF  59.53 3 0.000 Reject   12.25 3 0.000 Reject 
XLI  136.63 3 0.000 Reject  86.74 3 0.000 Reject 
XLK  45.114 3 0.000 Reject  65.50 3 0.000 Reject  
XLP  41.44 3 0.000 Reject  34.51 3 0.000 Reject 
XLU  113.38 3 0.000 Reject  42.36 3 0.000 Reject 
XLV  12.52 3 0.006 Reject  20.23 3 0.000 Reject 
XLY  173.62 3 0.000 Reject  35.64 3 0.000 Reject 
 
 
Table A.5: Weekly Data: Granger Causality Tests for Volatility 
𝑯𝟎: 𝑫𝒐𝒆𝒔 ?̂?𝒕
𝟐 𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝑹𝒕? 
  GARCH(1,1)  AV model 
ETFs  χ2 Lag p–value Decision  χ2 Lag p–value Decision 
XLB  14.89 3 0.002 Reject  0.81 3 0.367 Fail 
XLE  2.37 3 0.499 Fail   0.40 3 0.527 Fail 
XLF  1.93 3 0.586 Fail  0.00 3 0.934 Fail  
XLI  4.24 3 0.236 Reject  0.25 3 0.613 Fail 
XLK  10.20 3 0.017 Reject  11.251 3 0.001 Reject 
XLP  11.42 3 0.010 Reject  0.72 3 0.393 Fail  
XLU  2.92 3 0.404 Fail  0.01 3 0.906 Fail 
XLV  20.17 3 0.000 Reject  1.96 3 0.161 Fail 
XLY  42.30 3 0.004 Reject  0.04 3 0.834 Fail 
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Figure A.1: ETF Time Series Plots (Volatility Clustering) 
  
Materials Select Sector SPDR Fund  Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund  
  
Financial Select Sector SPDR Fund  Industrial Select Sector SPDR Fund  
  
Technology Select Sector SPDR Fund  Consumer Staples Select Sector SPDR Fund 
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Utilities Select Sector SPDR Fund Health Care Select Sector SPDR Fund 
  
Consumer Discretionary Select Sector SPDR Fund  SPDR S&P 500 Fund 
 
 
Figure A.2: ETF Returns Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Function 
 
-.
1
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
p
x
lu
re
t
01jan2000 01jan2005 01jan2010 01jan2015
date
-.
1
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
p
x
lv
re
t
01jan2000 01jan2005 01jan2010 01jan2015
date
-.
1
5
-.
1
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
p
x
ly
re
t
01jan2000 01jan2005 01jan2010 01jan2015
date
-.
1
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
p
s
p
y
re
t
01jan2000 01jan2005 01jan2010 01jan2015
date
33 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 36 
 
Chapter 2: How Government Ownership, Board Characteristics and Social Norms 
Influence the Firm’s Payout Policy: An Evidence from Saudi Arabian Public Firms 
 
1. Introduction 
The firm’s payout policy has puzzled researchers since the dividends irrelevance 
proposition (Miller & Modigliani, 1961) in a frictionless market was presented. Many 
explanations were provided because of the existence of market frictions. Dividends have 
been considered to be a means to reduce the agency costs and minimize information 
asymmetry. It is also influenced by the difference in taxing dividends and capital gains 
and provides investors a time-varying taste of dividends. The decrease in firms which pay 
dividends (Fama and French in 2001) versus the increase in the aggregate real dividends 
(DeAngelo et al., 2004) adds to the complexity, thus explaining the firm payout policy 
and determining whether it is shaped by market conditions or firm-specific factors. 
This essay will identify the determinant of payout policy in a frontier market. The 
characteristics of the Saudi market make it interesting to study due to its government 
ownership and the dominance of individual traders within daily transactions. The 
government not only establishes firms and owns the majority of their stocks but also uses 
its investment funds to buy and sell stock as if they were institutional investors. The 
dominance of individual traders, who mostly demand Islamic-compliant firms, raises the 
question of their ability to make sophisticated investment decisions and monitor firms’ 
managers. The Islamic compliance spans all aspects of firms’ operations, from what they 
invest in to their financing decisions.   
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Section 2 provides a review of the literature regarding payout policy and 
corporate governance, with a focus on board characteristics. Section 3 describes the 
methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data used in the 
empirical models. Section 5 presents results, and Section 6 presents a robustness check. 
Section 7 concludes this chapter.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Payout Policy 
The irrelevance proposition by Miller and Modigliani (1961; hereafter MM) states that, in 
perfect capital markets, dividends policy does not affect firm value. Therefore, payout 
policy has no effect on either a firm’s stock value or its risk, because the firm value is 
determined by its basic earning power and its business risk. The theory made several 
important assumptions, including the absence of taxes and brokerage costs, which implies 
that the shareholders face no cost to construct and change their own dividends policy by 
selling and buying stocks. If the firms pay lower dividends than the shareholders desire, 
they can sell a fraction of their ownership to generate the targeted income. Conversely, if 
the firm pays more than the shareholders want, they can use the extra income to buy more 
shares. As MM explain, if the firm pays dividends without any change in its investment 
and financing policy, then it must issue new shares to pay dividends to its current 
shareholders from the money raised from the new shareholders. However, this action 
represents an exchange of money from the old to the new shareholders. In this process, 
the firm value does not change, because the new share value equals the old value minus 
dividend that were paid by the new shareholders that pay out the policy irrelevance. In 
contrast to MM’s view, firms pay dividends.  
Several attempts were made to explain that by relaxing MM’s assumptions. Miller 
(1977), for example, addresses the presence of tax in the market. The capital gain, which 
refers to the changes in the stock price during the investment period, has a lower tax rate 
than that of dividends. Therefore, companies that distribute dividends are likely to have a 
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higher cost of equity compared to firms that do not distribute dividends. Because the 
capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than dividends, investors require a higher return on 
firms that pay dividends. Moreover, different investors have different tax rates that create 
clienteles for payout policy. Individuals who have a lower tax rate will prefer dividend-
paying firms, while high tax rate investors favor firms that do not pay dividends and are 
expected to have higher capital gains. The findings by Elton and Gruber (1970) and 
Graham and Kumar (2006) support this investor preference, which was used to explain 
why the stock price drop is less than dividends on the ex-dividends day. Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) use the CAPM model that accounts for a progressive tax scheme and 
find that a higher dividend yield is positively related to the dividends and capital gains 
tax differential. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) survey and interview 407 
financial executives and conclude that dividend taxation is not the first concern for 
managers. Hietala (1990) finds that most of the sellers of Finnish stocks on ex-dividend 
days are individuals with a high tax rate. Also, Rantapuska (2008) shows that investors 
who prefer dividend income buy cum-dividend tend to sell stocks ex-dividend, and vice 
versa. However, the same observation was documented by Frank and Jagannathan (1998) 
in the Hong Kong market, where dividends and capital gains are not taxed. Poterba and 
Summers (1984) attribute the ex-dividend day abnormal return in the British market to 
the changes in the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains. Chetty and Saez 
(2005) suggest that the 2003 dividend tax cut increased dividend and dividends’ 
initiation, while the firms with high levels of nontaxable institutional ownership did not 
change payout policies. However, Brav et al. (2008) perform executives’ interviews that 
reveal that maintaining cash flow stability and the previous level of dividends is more 
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important than tax reduction. This finding is also supported by Hasib and Hassan (2017); 
they find that the firm with financial slack defined as cash in excess of the expected 
investment requirement and the expected the cost of financial distress is more likely to 
have a flexible payout policy. They also show that financial slack determines the payout 
policy in which the firms with the lower (higher) volatility of the slack are more likely to 
pay dividends (share repurchase). 
Poterba (2004) estimates that individuals hold only 57% of equities in 2003 from 
90% in the 1950s. Del Guercio (1996) finds that dividend yield has no power to explain 
mutual funds or banks’ portfolio choices. Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007) find that the 
institutional investors change the stocks they hold when firms change their dividend 
policy. Desai and Jin (2011) establish a link between firm payout policy and the clients of 
intuitional investors’ clients. The firm may increase or decrease dividends based on the 
tax characteristics of institutional investors’ clients. Fos et al. (2014) draw attention to the 
significant special dividend payments at the end of 2012 in anticipation of the dividends 
tax change.  
The irreverence of payout policy assumes that all market participants have the 
same information. When information asymmetry exists, firms use dividends to signal to 
the market their confidence in future cash flow (Miller & Rock, 1985). However, bad 
firms might try to replicate the dividend policy of good firms, but this strategy is not 
sustainable, as bad firms’ cash flow is not enough to pay dividends, and they would have 
to issue new capital. The additional capital issuance would raise the cost of capital and 
would send a negative signal to the market. Therefore, the market penalizes bad firms 
over time, and they are no longer able to pay dividends.  
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The implications of Lintner (1965) and Fama (2001) in this field suggest that 
companies try to maintain long-term target dividend payout ratios and that mature firms 
with stable earnings are likely to have a higher dividend payout ratio than growing firms. 
Also, managers avoid changing the payout policy and pay more attention to dividend 
changes rather than the absolute number and change the dividends payout ratio, as there 
is a long-term improvement in earnings.  
Others find different explanations for this “dividend puzzle” in the finance 
literature, such as Black (1976).  Several roles for the dividend policy have been 
suggested and tested. Some argue that dividend is an outcome of good governance 
mechanisms, and others believe that it is used as a signal of the strength of the firms’ 
future cash flow. Among many factors, tax rates, liquidity, risk, and profitability have 
more influence on the firm payout policy. Dividends may contain agency cost (Jensen, 
1986) by aligning manager and shareholders’ interests (Easterbrook, 1984) and raising 
the payout ratio (Rozeff, 1982), which is a substitute for other forms of monitoring.  
Fama and French (2001) find that “the proportion of firms paying cash dividends 
falls from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999” due to the listing of small, high-growth, and 
low-profitability firms. They also note that “firms have become less likely to pay 
dividends,” regardless of their characteristics. DeAngelo et al. (2004) disagree with the 
disappearing dividends theory. They show that even though the number of dividend-
paying firms has decreased, the dollar value of real dividends has increased, thus 
exhibiting a concentrated dividends supply. Michaely and Roberts (2012) find that public 
firms smooth dividends because of the scrutiny of public capital markets, and therefore, 
“ownership structure and incentives play key roles in shaping dividend policies.” 
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Jensen (1986) expresses the belief that the predominant problem is the conflicts 
arising from the investment decision of the firm when managers’ (the agent) interests are 
not streamlined with the interests of the shareholders (the principal). Limiting the 
problem of free cash flow depends on the efficiency of governance mechanisms that 
would either restrict the manager’s access to idle resources or by aligning their interests 
with those of the shareholders. Several internal and external mechanisms were identified 
by works of corporate governance research to ensure that the manager acts in the best 
interests of the shareholders. The internal mechanisms include managerial ownership, the 
executive compensation scheme, and the independence of the board of directors. The 
external mechanisms consist of debt financing, a long-term relationship with large 
creditors, and the market conditions for managerial labor.   
The role of debt as a monitoring mechanism in reducing the agency costs and 
hence the problem of free cash flow is well recognized. The consequences of failure in 
meeting commitments imposed by debt are colossal, which drive the manager to perform 
better and dry the free cash flow available to them. Jensen (1986) believes that debt is an 
effective tool to prevent poor management, because debt directly reduces the free cash 
flow due to the pre-commitment of interest payment. The excess cash flow and low 
growth opportunity can be attenuated by using more debt financing (Jensen, 1986). There 
is extensive research that supports this notion. Harvey et al. (2004) find that debt 
alleviates the free cash flow problem in emerging markets. Gul and Jaggi (1999) confirm 
Jensen’s view, claiming that debt has a positive effect in controlling free cash flow, 
especially during times of low investment opportunity. Even though debt solves some 
managerial shortcomings, it does not improve the investment decision by the manager. 
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This finding is noted by Hart and Moore (1995), who refer to the phenomenon as the 
overinvestment problem. 
Wu (2004) supports the free cash flow hypothesis through a study of Japanese 
firms. He concluded, “the sensitivity of ownership structure to leverage depends on 
growth opportunities and free cash flow.” The issuance of new debt controls the 
overinvestment, which has a positive impact on equity (D’Mello and Miranda, 2010). 
However, Jiragporn et al. (2011) find a negative relation between leverage and firm 
governance quality. 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Board Characteristics  
Many views and interpretations of the role of payout policy on corporate governance and 
hence on firm value have surfaced within the industry literature. The literature review 
highlights the interaction between dividends and specifies whether they are causes or 
results of corporate governance, whose main objective is to minimize the agency cost by 
having good monitoring systems to motivate the manager to act in the best interests of the 
shareholder. Jiraporn et al. (2011) find that firms with better governance are able to pay 
dividends, and the dividends payer would thus pay higher dividends. 
Bris and Cabolis (2008) assess the effect of the importance of governance that 
protects investors in acquisitions. When a firm acquires a 100% share of another firm in a 
different country, then the acquired firm is subject to the law of the acquirer firm’s 
country and thus to its corporate governance system. They find that, if the investor 
protection and corporate governance are better in the new country, the higher merger 
premium is in comparison to a similar acquisition within that country. Poor corporate 
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governance is believed to be one of the structural weaknesses responsible for several 
financial crises and scandals (Johnson et al., 2002, Nam & Nam, 2005, Alen, 2009). 
While weak corporate governance may not have been a cause of the East Asian crisis 
from 1997 to 1998, the corporate governance practices have made countries more 
susceptible to a financial crisis effects that could have been minimized at the beginning of 
the crisis (Mitton, 2001). Corporate governance is an important factor in the financial 
market development and firm value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1999). The corporate governance 
explains not only cross-country but also cross-firm performance within countries during 
the crisis (Mitton 2001). The failure of several corporate governance mechanisms such as 
weak protection of outside investors, poor information disclosure, and ownership 
concentration is documented by several papers as reasons for firm value deterioration 
(Bowen 2007, Alen 2009).  
The dividends may discourage managers from investing in negative net present 
value projects, getting involved in empire-building behavior that extends that firm 
beyond its optimal value, or simply exerting less effort and using excessive perks. These 
are symptoms of a lack of an effective monitoring system which will lead to increased 
agency costs.  
The top managers’ decisions seem to be influenced by the board of directors, 
which itself is an essential element of the firm monitoring system. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance systems is ultimately shaped by the effectiveness 
of the boards of directors, which is a result of its characteristics. Board characteristics 
such as independence, board size, board composition, and leadership structure determine 
the effectiveness of the board to presume its roles and are vital to the success of corporate 
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governance effectiveness. Nam and Nam (2005) question the ability of the board of 
directors to perform its function, because it is weak in selecting, monitoring, replacing the 
Chief Executive Officer, and reviewing the remuneration of key executives and directors. 
Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that the smaller the number of board 
members, the more cohesive and productive it is, and thus it can better monitor the firm. 
The same conclusion was drawn by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), who argue that the 
larger board members may increase agency problem and the risk of free riders. Likewise, 
Lipton and Lorch (1992) propose that seven or eight directors for the board would limit 
the coordination, communication, and decision-making problems that are likely to arise 
in larger boards. The above arguments were empirically tested, and a negative association 
between board size and performance was reported. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) conduct a 
study on a sample of 271 Malaysian and Singaporean firms and report a negative 
relationship between board size and firm value.  Likewise, study of US and Finnish firms 
shows the same pattern, as observed by Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998).   
On the other hand, other papers argued that a larger board would result in a higher 
monitoring capacity, as it is harder for the manager to dominate the board (Pearce and 
Zahra, 1989, Dalton and Dalton, 2005).  Nam and Nam (2005) study a sample of firms in 
Asia and find that small board size may lack the right skills and experiences, which 
prevent members from expressing opinions and providing the needed advice for the 
manager. Similarly, Pearce and Zahra (1992) find that the board size has a positive 
relationship with firm performance, and the same conclusion was drawn by Chaganti et 
al. (1985).  
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According to agency theory, the CEO and chairperson of the board should be 
separated, as holding both positions creates a conflict of interest and reduces the 
efficiency of the director's control mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
1993). Nam and Nam (2005) find that the separation of the roles of chair and CEO is a 
powerful mechanism that can lessen CEO power and enhance the monitoring role of the 
board’s members. Rechner and Dalton (1991) support the agency theory’s expectations of 
poor shareholder returns from CEO duality. The companies with CEO duality have lower 
returns on equity (ROE), returns on investment (ROI), and profit margins. The strong 
power concentration of CEO duality increases both managerial opportunism and the 
probability of withholding information from directors (Forker, 1992). 
As an alternative to agency theory, stewardship theory states that managers act as 
responsible stewards of the assets they control when left on their own. Stewardship 
theory advocates support the claim that CEO duality has positive effects on firm 
performance and strategic management (Donaldson, 1990; Barney, 1990). They view the 
separation of the roles of chair and CEO as a force that depresses strategic planning and 
triggers power struggles.  Davis et al. (1997) and Muth and Donaldson (1998) find that 
CEO duality increases the depth of knowledge and technical skills of CEOs, which helps 
them to engage in sustainable growth operations and leads the firms during crises. 
Likewise, Berg and Smith (1978) show that the CEO duality has a direct relation to the 
return on equity. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors are more independent and 
may be better able to place controls on managers than the inside directors because of their 
specialization. The board’s effectiveness increases in part due to the outside directors’ 
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ability to reduce the managers’ opportunism and provide high-quality advice to the 
manager (Johnson et al., 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1998) find that gender diversity on the board improves firm performance. The same 
authors document that firms appoint an independent director with political and 
governmental work experience when the firm has larger exports or government agency 
are one of its clients (2000). Also, firms hire independent directors with political and 
legal backgrounds when their possible lawsuits or regulations are in the process of 
modification by the government. Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Rosentein and Wyatt 
(1990) find that boards dominated by independent directors are more likely to behave in 
the best of shareholders. Nam and Nam (2005) recommend that appointing independent 
directors in Asian firms as a reform can improve the board’s independence and hence 
boost its ability to fulfill the board duties. It was documented that independent directors 
are associated with fraud reduction in financial statements (Beasley, 1996), an increase in 
voluntary disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), and improvement in audit quality 
(O’Sullivan, 2000).  
On the other hand, the proponent of stewardship theory justifies having more 
executives on the board to ensure efficient functioning of the board (Donaldson, 1990; 
Barney, 1990). The executives are expected to safeguard the contractual relationship 
between the firm and the board (Williamson, 1985), and their high technical expertise on 
the firm’s operations helps them in their monitoring role (Baysigner and Hoskisson, 
1990; Goodstein et al., 1994).   
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3. Methodology  
First, we assess the effects of the control variables regarding whether the relationships 
that are documented in the literature hold in the sample of Saudi firms. Dividends have a 
negative relationship on growth opportunities (Rozeff, 1982; Lloyd et al., 1985; Jensen et 
al., 1992; Holder et al., 1998). This essay uses the return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for 
firm profitability, as was applied in other papers, such as Gill et al. (2011). The literature 
shows that the profitability of the firm is a significant and positive factor of dividend 
policy (Fama & French, 2000; Jensen et al., 1992). Firm size is usually used as a sign of 
significant internal control systems (Kenney and McDaniel, 1989; Defond and Jiambalvo, 
1991). Firm size is also positively correlated with financial performance and negatively 
with a market risk (Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002; Sengupta, 1998). Behr and Güttler 
(2007) report that larger firms are less risky and enjoy greater access to debt markets 
compared to smaller firms. Smaller firms are often charged a higher interest rate due to 
their lack of diversification (Lehmann & Neuberger, 2000; D’Auria, Foglia, & Reedtz, 
1999). Irani and Oesch (2013) find that brokerage house mergers reduce analyst 
coverage, thus leading to a deterioration in financial reporting quality. They deduce that 
“Security analysts monitor managers and entrenched managers adopt less informative 
disclosure policies in the absence of such scrutiny.”  
Financial leverage may play a monitoring role as a governance mechanism in 
reducing the agency costs and may increase dividends. This would formulate the next 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The dividend is positively associated with financial leverage. 
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Driffield et al. (2007) find that ownership concentration (major shareholder or 
block shareholder) has a significantly positive effect on firm value. Large shareholders 
have a larger stake in the firm. Hence, they are highly motivated and able to monitor the 
firm and influence managerial decisions. Ownership concentration may imply effective 
governance, and therefore, major shareholders are able to reduce the free cash flow risk 
and help in improving company operation that would result in higher dividends. Borisova 
and Megginson (2011) study the government ownership on credit spread, a proxy for the 
cost of debt, and find that increased government ownership decreases the credit spread, 
especially in partially privatized firms. Chemmanur et al. (2009) find that institutional 
investors receive higher allocations in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) that have better 
long-run stock returns. This finding is consistent with the notion that institutions possess 
private information about SEOs and information production that states that informed 
investors trade in the same direction as their private information, both before and after the 
SEO. This formulates the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The dividend is positively associated with ownership concentration. 
In addition to debt, Jensen and Meckling (1976) believe that managers’ equity 
ownership serves as another mechanism for reducing the agency costs. Agrawal and 
Jayaraman (1994), Warfield et al. (1995), and McConnell and Servaes (1995) find a 
positive relationship between manager ownership and firm performance. Firms with 
strong governance have governance mechanisms that align the interests of managers and 
shareholders and are designed to reduce agency problems that then, in turn, increase 
dividends. This formulates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The dividend is positively associated with managerial ownership. 
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Independent directors provide a sincere advice, since they enjoy more freedom 
than the executives and have a great deal of experience (Richardson, 2002; Lasfer, 2002). 
Belden et al. (2005) find that independent directors tend to reduce the agency costs of the 
firm. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find a 17% decrease in CEO pay among firms 
that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ board independence 
requirements. However, Guthrie explains that this finding is due to observation outliers 
and doubts the effectiveness of independent directors in reducing CEO pay. Hwang and 
Kim (2009) assert that firms whose boards are socially independent pay less but design a 
performance-sensitive CEO compensation. Schmidt (2014) uses the social ties of board 
members with CEOs to measure their effect on takeover decision and find that the effect 
is more important when the value of board advice is high but that CEO-members’ social 
ties have an adverse effect when monitoring is more important. This formulates the next 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Dividends are positively associated with board independence. 
CEO duality hinders the ability of the CEO who holds a chairperson position to 
exercise an independent self-evaluation (Rechner and Dalton, 1989). It was found that the 
firms which revised their policy to prevent CEO duality experienced a significant 
improvement in performance (Fosberg and Nelson, 1999). Therefore, this formulates the 
next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Dividends are negatively associated with the chairman-CEO duality. 
Modum et al. (2013) find that the board size has a positive and significant impact 
on firms’ performance. Tarak Nath and Apu (2013) study selected firms and conclude 
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that the board size is positively related to firm performance. This formulates the next 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The dividend payout ratio is positively associated with board size. 
Greco (2011) finds that board meetings increase with management ownership and 
decrease with independent directors on the audit committee. Tarak Nath and Apu (2013) 
studied selected firms and concluded that the number of board meetings is positively 
related to firm performance. Hoque et al. (2013) find that the financial performance of 
Australian firms has a direct relation to the number of meetings that the audit committee 
and remuneration committee hold per year.  
Hypothesis 7: The dividend is positively associated with board meetings. 
The hypotheses are tested using OLS regression with dividends per share as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are state ownership, major shareholders, 
board characteristics, and control variables such firm size and leverage.  The dividends 
may be cash dividends that are usually paid semiannually in Saudi Arabia. In this essay, 
we make no distinction between regular and special dividends. The regular dividends 
likely to be constant in the future, but extraordinary or special dividends are not expected 
to be repeated at least for the foreseeable future. The shareholders may be compensated 
by stock dividend when they receive additional stock from the company as a form of 
dividends. As the third form of compensation for its shareholders, the firm may engage in 
stock repurchases through open-market operation, a tender offer to improve the capital 
gain of its shareholders. The stock dividends and repurchases are not tested in this essay, 
because the data are incomplete and scattered in companies’ annual reports.  
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Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find Lintner’s (1956) model to be the best 
to explain dividend decisions. Fama and Babiak (1968) find that Lintner’s (1956) 
explanatory power is as good as other models, if not better. Wang, Manry, and Wandler 
(2011) base their work on that of Lintner (1956), as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑟𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                      (1) 
Where: 
DIV*it  is the target dividend per share for firm i at time t 
EPSit  is the earnings per share for firm i at time t, and  
ri is the target payout ratio.  
 
The actual dividends change is a function of the previous dividends and the current target 
dividends.  
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 =  𝛼0𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖(𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                        (2) 
 
The intercept is the corporate reluctance to decrease dividends and ci the management 
response speed to earnings changes. By substituting model (1) into model (2) and 
expanding, 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 =  𝛼01 + 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                        (3) 
 
By adding prior year dividends to both sides, we have   
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼01 + 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝑐𝑖)𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (4) 
 
And an estimate of the above model yearly and pooled over years as  
 53 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                              (5) 
Where: 
DIVit  is the dividend per share for firm i at time t 
EPSit is the earnings per share for firm i at time t  
Β1t is ctrt ,and   
Β2t is (1-ct)  
The interaction between the management speed of the adjustment in dividends and the 
fraction of earnings usually paid as dividends (ctrt) determines the target payout ratio. If 
ct=1, the prior year dividend term disappears, which is an indication that firms do not 
smooth dividends and change their dividends according to the changes in earnings. If 
ct=0, the sample firms follow a strict dividends policy and do not like to change their 
dividends when their earnings change.  
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝛿3𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝛿3𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿3𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                          (6) 
Model (6) includes the state ownership dummy (GOV) and allows for interaction 
between state ownership and current earnings (EPS) and prior year dividends to check 
whether the regression function is different for SOEs versus non-SOEs. We test for the 
joint significance of the dummy and its interactions with earnings and previous 
dividends.  
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𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                   (7) 
Where: 
GOVit is a dummy variable equal to one if the state holds shares of firm i at time t  
Boardit is board characteristics for firm i at time t, and  
Controlsit are control variables that include firm size and leverage   
 
Board characteristics include board size, independent directors, CEO duality, the number 
of board meetings, and the existence of shares of ownership concentration. Managerial 
ownership (MOWN) is the percentage of all shares owned by board members and 
executives and their dependents divided by the total number of shares. Board size 
(BSIZE) is measured by the number of board members. Outside directors (INDEP) is the 
ratio of the independent directors to board size. Duality equals 1 when the same person 
holds the positions of CEO and Chairman, and 0 otherwise. The number of annual board 
meetings (BMET) represents a proxy for board motivation in planning and monitoring 
firm operations. The Saudi Stock Exchange requires the company to disclose individuals 
and entities that hold 5% or more of the common shares. Ownership concentration 
dummy (CONC) is 1 when the firm has investors who own 5% or more of outstanding 
common stocks. The control variables include firm size (SIZE), which is the natural log 
of the total value of assets (LnAssets), and (LEV) is the debt-to-assets ratio. With all 
regressions, we consider year and economic division to be fixed effects.  
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𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑡SOCIAL𝑖𝑡          
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                      (8) 
Where: 
SOCIALit  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i at time t is considered 
compliant with the shareholder social norms, specifically with Islamic guidelines in 
finance and investment.  
 
We need to understand social norms to explain firm decisions and shareholders’ 
behavior. A social norm is the accepted behavior to which an individual is expected to 
conform, and it represents the purpose and the foundation of correct behaviors. 
Compliance with Islamic principles may limit a firm’s access to the debt market and 
increase the need to hold more cash. It may also prevent the firm from investing certain 
businesses or limit its investment opportunity set. However, firm failure to meet Islamic 
guidelines may deter shareholders, forcing the firm to pay higher dividends compared to 
complaint firm to attract investors. We consider a firm complaint with shareholders’ 
social norm if the firm is considered to be compliant with at least three out of five well-
known Islamic indexes in the Saudi market.  
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𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝛿3𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑡𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝛿3𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿3𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                          (9) 
Where: 
CDit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends in the current year 
CDit-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends in the previous year 
 
Model (9) is a logistic model used to estimate the likelihood of a company to pay 
dividends considering the current earnings and whether the dividends had been paid 
during the previous year. The model adds the effect of the state ownership and its 
interaction with earnings and the previous year’s decision to pay dividends.   
 
The endogeneity problem is a concern regarding measuring the effect of the firm and 
board characteristics on corporate governance. Following Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Coles et al. (2008), Linck et al. (2007), and Mcknight 
and Wier (2009), we use the lagged values of the endogenous variables (i.e., board 
characteristics, major shareholders’ ownership). All regressions are run with the year and 
economic sector fixed effect.  
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4. THE DATA 
The Saudi Stock Exchange Company is known as Tadawul. The following information 
offers a brief history of Tadawul based on the information provided on its website7. Saudi 
joint stock companies began in the 1930s. Forty-five years later, there were about 14 
public companies. The rapid economic expansion in the 1970s led the government to 
embark on forming a regulated market for trading together with the required systems in 
1980. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was thus named to regulate and 
develop the market in 1984. SAMA remained in charge until the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) was established in July 2003 under the Capital Market Law (CML). 
The CMA is the sole regulator and supervisor of capital markets; it issues the required 
rules and regulations to protect investors and ensure fairness and efficiency in the market. 
In March 2007, The Council of Ministers approved the formation of the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul) Company. Tadawul is the only stock exchange in Saudi Arabia, 
with 163 listed firms in 15 different industries and categories. It is located in Riyadh, the 
capital city of Saudi Arabia. The market index reached its historical peak in February 
2006, exceeding 206348 points. In 2016, the total market capitalization reached US$ 
448.52 billion, and the total value of shares traded during 2014 was US$ 308.53 billion.9  
The ownership had been limited to Saudi nationals and expatriates who work in 
Saudi Arabia until recently. A new decision was made to open the market to international 
                                                          
7 The Saudi Stock Exchange Company (Tadawul) website http://www.tadawul.com.sa/ 
8 Tadawul’s 2006 annual report retrieved from its website on October 26, 2014 
9 Tadawul’s 2016 annual report retrieved from its website on June 29, 2017 
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investors without restrictions in June 201510. The chairperson is usually one of the 
principal founders of the firm or major capital provider. In companies in which the 
government is the primary owner, the chairperson is usually from a public institution 
responsible for organizing the firm’s sector. The board is elected every three years, a 
period that can be extended every three years for unlimited times. There are no clear rules 
regarding what determines the firm board size, but any change should be approved by the 
majority of the shareholders in annual meetings. The Saudi economy depends heavily on 
oil, which is exclusively explored, refined, and distributed by a firm that is 100% owned 
by the government, called ARAMCO. This company is not registered with the Saudi 
Stock market. ARAMCO can hire other companies, public or private, to perform 
particular jobs for a short time or as part of an extended agreement. The sectors with the 
largest average traded value in the Saudi stock values are the insurance, petrochemical 
industries, real estate development, and financial sectors. 
The accounting data are taken from Compustat. However, since many data points 
are missing, we collect the supplementary accounting data from companies’ websites or 
the Tadawul website, the official Saudi Stock Exchange website. The remaining data 
were collected from the firm’s annual reports that were found on the Tadawul website 
and Argaam.com.  
 
 
                                                          
10 Consultation on a Market Reclassification Proposal for The MSCI Saudi Arabia Index retrieved from MSCI website on June 29, 
2017 
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5. Results Discussion  
This section includes an overview of the variables summary statistics. Moreover, this 
section provides an extensive analysis and a discussion of the results. We start with the 
influence of state ownership on dividends. Secondly, we explore how social norms affect 
dividends because of perceived risk, liquidity, or access to the debt market. Thirdly, we 
discuss the effect of the board characteristics on dividends. Certain board characteristics 
are believed to improve firm governance. A good governance system ensures that 
financial resources are spent on the right venues, including paying dividends to its 
shareholders.   
 
Table 1 
 Pooled results from estimation model (5), regressing dividends per share on prior dividends, and 
earnings per share for the year 2004-2015 inclusive.  
 Model(5): DPSit=αt+β1tEPSit+ β2tDPSit-1+Ʃβitcontrolsit+εit 
  Variable Coefficient  
  Intercept 0.3144 
    (1.38) 
  EPS: Earnings Per Share 0.2477 
    (9.51) 
  DPSlag: Dividends Per Share lag 0.5400 
    (20.89) 
  Grow: Assets Percentage Increase -0.0037 
    (-0.34) 
  ROA: Profitability -0.8992 
    (-1.35) 
 Ln(Assets): Firm Size -0. 0035 
  ( -0.10) 
 LEV: Financial Leverage -0.5310 
  (-1.79) 
  TANG: Tangible Assets  0.1525 
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    (0.80) 
  F-value 183.66 
  Adjusted R2 0.6196 
  N 786 
Coefficients are the regression estimates for Saudi firms using WRSD data after adding the missing 
variables from 2004 to 2015, inclusive. T-stats are reported. F-statistics are signiﬁcant at 0.000. 
 
We expect that firms with good growth opportunities have their resources 
tightened up for the current and upcoming project. We find an insignificant positive 
relation between dividends and growth opportunities, contrary to the findings of other 
papers (Rozeff, 1982; Lloyd et al., 1985; Jensen et al., 1992; Holder et al., 1998)  
When seeking to prove the second hypothesis, as in many papers, we use the 
return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for firm profitability. The profitable firms may have an 
abundance of cash, especially when they have low growth opportunities. Such conditions 
may increase dividends if corporate governance systems are effective. The profitability of 
the firm is a significant and positive factor of the dividend policy (Fama and French, 
2000). Under this policy, the profitable firms are expected to distribute higher dividends 
when they are confident about their ability to generate enough cash flow in the future or 
have low growth opportunities. However, we do not find a significant relationship 
between these attributes in our sample. 
With regard to the third hypothesis, we expect that firm size is positively 
correlated with financial performance and negatively with market risk (Mitton, 2002). 
Firm size is usually used as a sign of significance within internal control systems 
(Kenney and McDaniel, 1989). Large firms usually have the resources to hire skilled 
CEOs, have access to experienced board members, and have more media coverage. For 
 61 
 
these reasons, dividends are expected to be higher in larger firms. Our sample shows an 
insignificant relation between dividends and firm size.  
With regard to the fourth hypothesis, the financial leverage, measured by debt 
ratio, is expected to have an inverse relation with the free cash flow problem and may 
increase dividends. Financial leverage may have a monitoring role as a governance 
mechanism in reducing agency costs. However, the benefits of debt as substitute 
monitoring do not necessarily lead to a higher dividends ratio among Saudi firms. 
5.1 State Ownership and Payout Policy 
We discuss the influence of state ownership on dividends. We explore whether the state-
owned entities (SOEs) have a different dividends policy from other sample firms (non-
SOEs). Examples of such differences are higher payout ratio or less dividends smoothing 
compared to other sample firms. The Saudi market is special because the government 
could be a lender and shareholder. The government taxes neither dividends nor capital 
gain, and its income is generated from exporting oil and gas over which it has the sole 
right of control. The government also influences the market through government 
spending. The majority of firms’ sales depend on the government’s new and ongoing 
projects. More government spending means more direct income (the government is the 
largest employer) and indirect income (more hiring and pay in the private sector) to 
residents of Saudi Arabia.  
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Table 2 
This table shows the sample statistics for the period of 2004-2015. It is categorized into three 
groups. Panel A shows the summary statistics of the firms for which the government holds some 
of its shares (SOEs). Panel B shows the summary statistics of the firms for which the government 
does not own any of its stock (non-SOEs). Panel C shows the same statistics for the full sample.  
a SOEs 
  Statistic Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  EPS          540  3.4 3.1 -5.9 17.2 
  DPS          540  2.0 2.2 0.0 13.0 
  ROE          538  14% 13% -38% 53% 
  ROA          538  7% 9% -24% 44% 
  Book-to-Market          538  0.6301 0.3517 0.0873 2.3732 
  Market Capitalization          538      22,708      48,812             80    370,865  
b Non-SOEs 
  Statistic Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  EPS       1,005  1.2 2.4 -7.7 17.5 
  DPS       1,005  1.1 1.4 0.0 14.0 
  ROE       1,003  1% 56% -1255% 57% 
  ROA       1,003  3% 11% -131% 47% 
  Book-to-Market       1,003  0.5209 0.4214 0.0053 9.0194 
  Market Capitalization       1,003        3,085        8,935             60    120,200  
c Full Sample 
  Statistic Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  EPS       1,545  1.9 2.9 -7.7 17.5 
  DPS       1,545  1.4 1.8 0.0 14.0 
  ROE       1,541  5% 46% -1255% 57% 
  ROA       1,541  4% 11% -131% 47% 
  Book-to-Market       1,541  0.5590 0.4017 0.0053 9.0194 
  Market Capitalization       1,541        9,936      31,149             60    370,865  
 
 
We note that, when the government invests in a company, it usually buys between 
5% and 70% and is typically a major shareholder. Our sample shows that the government 
invests in 30% of the public listed companies, which the market values represent 41% of 
the market capitalization on average. The government owns companies that have higher 
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earnings and dividends per share. Those companies are also more profitable and less 
overvalued than those in the rest of the sample. 
 
Table 3 
Pooled results from estimation model (5), regressing dividends per share on prior dividends and 
earnings per share for the years 2004-2015, inclusive.  
Model (5): DPSit=αt+β1tEPSit+ β2tDPSit-1+εit 
 Statistic Constant EPSt DPSt-1 
 Coefficient estimate  0.1731 0.1907 0.5749 
 T- Stat 4.59 16.06 31.04 
 No. of observations 1,372   
 Adjusted R2 0.6401   
 F-statistic 1222.20   
Coefficients are regression estimates for Saudi firms using the WRSD data after adding the missing 
variables from years 2004 to 2015, inclusive. T-stats are reported, and p-values are significant at 
the 0.01 level. F-statistic is signiﬁcant at 0.000. Excluding companies that did not pay dividends 
for two consecutive years reduces the sample to 932 but produces similar results.   
 
Our sample shows that the current earnings and prior dividends are significant 
factors in the dividends decision, and their explanatory power is 62%. It seems that 
dividends smoothing (B2t=1-ct=.0.43) is a common policy in the sample. The EPS 
coefficient can be used to estimate the target payout ratio. The result shows that the target 
payout rate is 0.44 (0.19/0.43).  
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Yearly results from regressing dividends per share on prior dividends and EPS 
show that prior year dividends and earnings per share are significant during all years with 
the exception of 2005 for the latter. Dividends smoothing and the speed of adjustment 
fluctuate between 0.18 and 0.79, and the target payout ratio is from 0.03 to 0.43.  
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Table 4 
Yearly results from estimating Model (5) regressing dividends per share on prior dividends and EPS for years 2004-2015, inclusive. From coefficient 
of one year dividends lag, the result shows dividends smoothing behavior.  
 Model(5): DPSit=αt+β1tEPSit+ β2tDPSit-1+εit 
  Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
  Intercept 0.50 0.43 -0.18 0.54 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.15 -0.05 
    (1.98 ) (1.67 ) (-0.75) (3.24 ) (2.16 ) (0.87 ) (0.91 ) (1.61 ) (1.34 ) (1.52 ) (-0.66) 
  EPS -0.01 0.12 0.36 0.25 0.34 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.13 
    (-0.26) (2.30 ) (6.82 ) (5.43 ) (7.63 ) (5.44 ) (2.97 ) (4.55 ) (5.96 ) (5.01 ) (4.66 ) 
  DPSit-1 0.67 0.56 0.70 0.21 0.38 0.69 0.82 0.79 0.71 0.58 0.72 
    (7.66 ) (7.45 ) (8.75 ) (3.51 ) (6.06 ) (13.05) (15.47) (18.41) (14.48) (10.55) (16.00) 
  F-value 35.95 36.32 95.07 38.11 86.37 247.11 337.65 456.92 268.08 162 243.88 
  Adj R2 0.4961 0.4817 0.6888 0.4073 0.5773 0.7885 0.8248 0.8612 0.7751 0.6722 0.7499 
  N 72 77 86 109 126 133 144 148 156 158 163 
T-stat is reported in the parenthesis. Earnings per share is significant in all years with the exception of 2005. Prior year dividend is significant in all 
years. Dividends smoothing or the speed of adjustment fluctuate from 0.18 to 0.79 and target payout ratio from 0.03 to 0.43.  
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The coefficient of earnings has a positive and significant effect on dividends per share. 
From the one-year lag of dividends, we can deduce that the dividends smoothing is 
common among Saudi firms. Moreover, this is more pronounced in state-owned firms, 
because the interaction term between SOEs dummy and previous dividends is significant 
and positive.  The dividends smoothing among SOEs is 0.39 (ct=1-B4t +B3t), and the 
target payout is 0.58 (0.23/0.39) from the firm after considering the effect of state 
ownership. The model is robust upon including the control variables (firm size, leverage, 
age) and the year- and industry-fixed effect. 
Table 5 
Pooled results from estimation model (6) with the interaction terms of SOE by regressing the 
dividends per share on prior dividends per share, EPS, and controls variables for the period from 
2004 to 2015. 
 Model(7) DPSit=αt+β1tEPSit+β2tEPSit*GOVit +B3tDPSit-1+B4tDPSit-1*GOVit+B5tGOVit   
+B6LEVit+B7tLn(Asset)it+εit 
  Variable   
  Intercept -0.0032 
    (-0.09) 
  EPS 0.2306 
    (10.60) 
  EPS*GOV -0.0041 
    (-0.13) 
  DPS 0.4091 
    (12.67) 
  DPS*GOV 0.1958 
    (4.28) 
 GOV -0.4115 
  (-3.25) 
  LEV -0.3472 
    (-1.25) 
  Ln(Assets) -0.0032 
    (-0.09) 
  F-value 63.74 
  Adjusted R2 0.6399 
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  N 1,025 
T-stats are reported in the parentheses. We reject the null that DPS and GOV coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero, as the P-value of the Wald test is 0.000. 
 
We use a fixed-effects logistic model to estimate the likelihood of a company paying 
dividends. The current earnings and state ownership increase the likelihood of a 
dividends payment. A dividends payment is more likely if the firm has paid dividends in 
the past.  
 
Table 6 
Results from estimation logit model (9) testing the influence of state ownership on the likelihood 
of paying dividends for years 2004 to 2015. 
Model(9) CDit=αt+β1tEPSit+β2tEPSit*GOVit +β3tCDit-1+ β4tCDit-1*GOVit + β5tGOVit +β6LEVit+ 
β7tLn(Asset)it+εit 
  Variable   
  Intercept -0.1111 
    (0.851) 
 EPS 0.2805 
   (0.000) 
 EPS*GOV 0.9683 
   (0.000) 
  Prior Dividends Dummy 2.7750 
    (0.000) 
  GOV -0.8197 
    (0.022) 
 LEV -1.3939 
  (0.045) 
  Ln(Assets) -0.0428 
    (0.628) 
  Model λ2  365.48 
  Pseudo R2 0.4085 
  N 1,025 
P-values are reported in parentheses. This is a fixed-effects logistic model to estimate the likelihood 
of a company paying dividends. Current earnings and state ownership increase the likelihood of 
dividends payment. Dividends payment is more likely if the firm has paid dividends in the past.  
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5.2 Board Characteristics and Payout Policy 
In this section, we discuss the effect of several board characteristics on dividends. Board 
characteristics include management share ownership, board size, chairperson-CEO 
duality, board meetings, independent directors, and the number of executives who are 
also board members. We measure the effect of non-SOE blockholders which expect to 
have a greater influence on firm decision compared to other shareholders.  
Table 7 
This table shows the sample firms’ board characteristic for years 2004-2015. It is categorized into 
three groups. Panel A shows the board characteristic summary statistics of the firms for which the 
government holds some of its shares (SOEs). Panel B shows the board characteristic summary 
statistics of the firms for which the government does not own any of its stock (non-SOEs). Panel C 
shows the same statistics for the full sample.  
a SOEs 
  Statistic Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Board Size           541 9 1.4 5 13 
  Board Annual Meetings          541 5.7 2.2 2 16 
  CEO Duality          541 0.1 0.3 0 1 
  Independent Directors          541 4.1 1.6 0 1 
  Indepen. Directors ratio          541 0.5 0.2 0 1 
 Executives on the board          541 0.6 0.8 0 4 
 Executives Ratio          541 0.1 0.1 0 0.4 
 Non-SOE Blockholders          541 0.5 0.5 0 1 
  MGMT Share Ownership          541 0.9      0.1  0    1  
b Non-SOEs 
  Statistic Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Board Size  978 8.2 1.6 4 12 
  Board Annual Meetings 978 4.8 1.9 1 17 
  CEO Duality 978 0.1 0.3 0 1 
  Independent Directors 978 3.9 1.6 0 9 
  Indepen. Directors Ratio 978 0.5 0.2 0 0.8 
 Executives on the Board 978 0.9 0.8 0 6 
 Executives Ratio 978 0.1 0.1 0 0.6 
 Non-SOE Blockholders 978 0.6 0.5 0 1 
  MGMT Share Ownership          978 0.9      0.3  0    1  
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c Full Sample 
  Statistic Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Board Size        1,519  8.4 1.6 4 13 
  Board Annual Meetings 1,519 5.2 2 1 17 
  CEO Duality 1,519 0.1 0.3 0 1 
  Independent Directors       1,519 4 1.6 0 10 
  Indepen. Directors Ratio 1,519 0.5 0.2 0 1 
 Executives on the Board 1,519 0.7 0.8 0 6 
 Executives Ratio 1,519 0.1 0.1 0 1 
 Non-SOE Blockholders 1,519 0.5 0.5 0 1 
  MGMT Share Ownership 1,519 0.9      0.3  0    1  
 
State-owned Entities’ (SOEs) boards are on average larger and hold more annual 
meetings compared to those of firms with no government ownership. The number of 
independent directors on SOEs’ boards is greater than that of the firm with no 
government ownership. Directors and top executives tend to own about the same number 
of shares whether there is state ownership or not. On the other hand, the number of 
executives who are also members of the board of directors is greater in non-SOEs. 
Moreover, block shareholders are more prevalent in firms for which the government is 
not a shareholder.  
Board size (BSIZE), on average is eight members, with a maximum of thirteen 
members and a minimum four members. The ratio of independent directors among the 
board members (INDEP) accounts for 50% on average. In only 10% of firms, the 
functions of the chairman and CEO are held by the same person (DUAL). The number of 
board of meetings (BMET), on average, is 5. The minimum number of meetings in a year 
is 1, while the maximum is 16. The major shareholders’ concentration or blockholder 
 70 
 
(NGOV), who hold at least 5% of the firm capital, own 50% of outstanding shares on 
average.  
Table 8 
Pooled results from estimation model (7) that include the board characteristics for the period from 
2004 to 2015. The second column shows the coefficients and significance of board characteristics 
in a subsample of state-owned entities (SOEs). The third column shows the coefficients and 
significance of board characteristics in a subsample of the firms in which the state is not a 
shareholder (non-SOEs). The last column shows the coefficients and significance of board 
characteristics in the full sample with year-fixed effects. 
Model(7) DPSit=αt+β1tEPSit+β2tEPSit*GOVit +B3tDPSit-1+B4tDPSit-1 *GOVit+B5tGOVit 
+ƩβitBoardit+B6LEVit+B7tLn(Asset)it+εit    
  Variable SOEs Non-SOEs Full Sample 
  Intercept -0.3621 0.4642 -0.3200 
    (-0.48) (1.29) -0.2600 
  Earnings Per Share (EPS) 0.2154 0.2221 0.2287 
    (8.41) (11.01) (13.57) 
  Dividends Per Share lag (DPSlag) 0.6152 0.3670 0.3781 
    (18.05) (11.48) (11.66) 
  DPSlag*GOV -- -- -0.3604 
    -- -- (5.14) 
  State Ownership Dummy (GOV) -- -- -0.3604 
    -- -- (-2.92) 
  Blockholders -0.0971 0.0331 0.0321 
    (-0.68) (0.35) (-2.92) 
  MGMT Share Ownership 0.9003 -0.0622 -0.0473 
    (2.04) (-0.48) (-0.34) 
  Board Size  -0.0050 -0.0127 -0.0422 
    (-0.11) (-0.39) (-1.61) 
  CEO Duality -0.0257 0.1128 -0.0880 
    (-0.11) (-0.39) (-0.75) 
  Indepen. Directors ratio 0.1280 -0.2332 -0.2441 
    (0.33) (-0.96) (-1.10) 
  Executives Ratio -0.2846 1.9517 1.3858 
    (-0.29) (4.30) (3.39) 
  Board Annual Meetings -0.0364 -0.0001 0.0052 
    (-1.24) (-0.00) (0.27) 
  Financial Leverage (LEV) -0.2048 -0.1093 -0.3706 
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    -0.3670 (-0.37) (-1.30) 
  Firm Size (Ln(Assets)) -0.0015 0.0018 -0.0217 
    -0.9590 (0.04) (-0.53) 
  F stat 94.8 51.8 51.6200 
  Adj R2 0.7308 0.4686 0.6423 
  N 381 635 1,016 
T-stats are reported in the parenthesis. -- indicates that government ownership dummy variable and 
its interaction with other variables are excluded from the regression since it was used to create the 
subsamples of SOE and Non-SOE.   
 
As we find before, the current earnings and previous dividends are significant factors in 
explaining dividends. In SOEs, we note that blockholders, board size, CEO-chairperson 
duality, annual board meetings, and executives who are also members of the board are 
insignificant. It seems that directors and top executives who share ownership increase 
dividends per share in the presence of government ownership. In non-SOEs, we note that 
blockholders, directors, and top executives sharing ownership, board size, CEO-
chairperson duality, and annual board meetings are insignificant. More executives on 
non-SOEs’ board of directors increase dividends per share.  
We turn our discussion to the effect of board characteristics on corporate 
governance mechanism (i.e. dividends policy). The first board characteristics are tested 
through the fifth hypothesis that ownership concentration (major shareholders or block 
shareholders), which may positively increase dividends. As reported by Driffield et al. 
(2007), the ownership concentration has significant positive effects on firm value, 
because major shareholders are more motivated to monitor the firm, and the manager is 
more inclined to listen to their opinions. Ownership concentration may imply effective 
governance, and therefore major shareholders can reduce the free cash problem and help 
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to improve company operations that would result in higher dividends. However, we find 
this to be a positive but insignificant relation within our sample.  
The second board characteristic we are interested in is management ownership, 
for which a percentage of shares are held by directors and top executives in a firm. The 
higher management ownership indicates confidence of the board and senior managers of 
a company in its current and future performance. It also aligns the manager interest with 
that of shareholders and thus serves as another mechanism for reducing the agency costs, 
as noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Therefore, the sixth hypothesis expects that the 
management ownership increases the propensity to pay dividends. The management 
ownership is not significant in our sample. 
The third board characteristic is the independence of the board. Board members 
are expected to enrich the board with their expertise. Independent directors may provide 
managers with sincerer advice, since they enjoy greater freedom than other board 
members. Lasfer Belden et al. (2005) find that independent directors tend to reduce the 
agency costs of the firm. We hypothesize that the presence of independent directors on 
the board improves corporate governance systems and hence reduces the free cash 
problem and increases the firm’s ability to pay dividends.  Our sample shows that 
independent directors, however, have insignificant relations with dividends.  
The fourth board characteristic of interest is the CEO duality. The results of CEO 
duality in the extant literature are mixed. This characteristic hinders the CEO’s ability to 
exercise independent self-evaluation, according to Rechner and Dalton (1989). Some 
researchers find that the separation of the two positions improves firm performance 
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(Fosberg and Nelson, 1999), while others draw different conclusions. The eighth 
hypothesis postulates that CEO duality increases the free cash flow problem and reduces 
dividends due to weak governance. CEO duality and dividends have an insignificant 
relationship in our sample.  
The annual meetings are expected to increase the involvement of the board 
members in firm operations, which assists them to judge on different matters and better 
advise the manager. A higher frequency of a firm’s annual board meetings allows more 
information to be revealed for board members and firm managers. More frequent 
meetings keep the board member informed and help to address potential problems in a 
timely manner. Those meetings also help managers to stay focused on strategic matters 
and push him/her to work harder to show progress at every meeting. The interactions 
between managers and board members in those meetings enhance the board’s ability to 
evaluate the manager and design compensation packages that motivate the manager to 
exert higher efforts. Therefore, we hypothesize that the greater number of meetings will 
reduce the free cash problem and increase the dividends due to the improved firm 
operations and governance. However, we find this relation to be insignificant in our 
sample.  
5.3 Social Norms and Payout Policy 
In this section, we discuss the effect of social norms on dividends, specifically firm 
compliance to Islamic guidelines in obtaining debt and making investing decisions. 
Islamic principles prohibit three main acts. The first is usury (Riba), which is the 
collection or payment of interest. The second is forbidden gambling and the similar 
unnecessary financial risk that depends mainly on chance and luck. The third act is a 
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prohibition of gharar, which is an exchange in which one or more parties stand to be 
deceived through ignorance of an essential element of the exchange. In the Saudi market, 
the overwhelming majority of investors are Muslims who invest and consider investing in 
firms that comply with Islamic guidelines of debt finance and investing. A firm that fails 
to comply with Islamic guidelines may have to pay more dividends compared to 
complaint firms with equivalent risk to compensate for perceived risks, including 
illiquidity.   
 
Table 9 
This table shows compliant firms according to five well-known rating organizations which issue 
reports on firm compliance with Islamic guidelines in financing and investing. It also shows the 
state ownership in those firms. Column 5 shows compliant firms if three of the reports confirm the 
firm’s compliance to Islamic guidelines. The last column shows the firms that were deemed to be 
non-compliant with Islamic guidelines by all rating agencies.  
     
  Variable AAOIFI Inma Alrajhi Compliant 
Non-
Compliant 
  Compliant Firm 1,273 1,230 1,231 1,196 349 
  State Ownership  405 421 409 405 136 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) was 
established to maintain and promote Shariah standards for Islamic financial institutions. Alinma 
Investment, a Saudi closed joint stock company wholly owned by Alinma Bank, is the leading 
company in the provision of a full range of Shariah-compliant investment products and services. 
Alrajhi Capital is a leading financial services company that provides Shariah-compliant financial 
products and services. Source: http://www.argaam.com/ar/company/shariahcompanies 
 
The social norm does not seem to matter. Firms compliant with Islamic guidelines 
do not decrease dividends to increase their cash holdings to make up for the limited 
access to debt market or because they are more liquid compared to non-compliant stocks. 
Moreover, firms that do not follow Islamic guidelines do not seem to have a different 
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dividends policy to compensate for the perceived risk for the limited investor base that 
may entail stock illiquidity. However, we assert that the insignificance of the social norm 
dummy variable may have been driven by the availability of conventional and Islamic 
debt instruments to all firms. Even though the Saudi government provides zero-interest 
loans to all firms, the state’s funds do not have a strong presence in the non-compliant 
firms (136 out of 405 firm-years). 
 
Table 10 
Pooled results from the estimation model (8) that estimate the effect of social norm on dividends 
per share for the period from 2004 to 2015. The second column shows the result of regressions, 
including the social norm dummy variable. The third column shows the result of a subsample of 
firms rated to meet the social norm (Islamic guidelines) by less than three rating agencies or none. 
All regressions are run with year-fixed effects. 
Model(6) DPSit=αt+β1tEPSit+β2tEPSit*GOVit +B3tDPSit-1+B4tDPSit-1 *GOVit+B5tGOVit 
+ƩβitBoardit+B6LEVit+B7tLn(Asset)it+εit    
  Variable Compliant Firm  Non-Compliant Firm 
  Social Nom Dummy Variable  0.0417 --- 
    -0.03 --- 
  Earnings Per Share (EPS) 0.2352 0.2221 
    -14.35 -1.57 
  Dividends Per Share (DPS) 0.3615 0.4926 
    -11.07 -3.32 
  DPS*GOV 0.2575 0.1612 
    -6.3 -0.46 
  State Ownership Dummy (GOV) -0.2809 -1.2854 
    (-2.39) (-1.13) 
  Non-SOE Blockholders -0.0476 0.1263 
    (-0.60) -0.15 
  MGMT Share Ownership 0.1337 0.191 
    -1.02 -0.16 
  Board Size  -0.0159 -0.2646 
    (-0.62) (-1.53) 
  CEO Duality 0.0594 -0.4252 
    -0.53 (-1.53) 
  Indepen. Directors ratio -0.2132 2.8483 
    (-1.02) -1.78 
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  Executives Ratio 1.0798 1.8688 
    -2.66 -0.66 
  Board Annual Meetings -0.012 -0.137 
    (-0.72) (-0.58) 
  Financial Leverage (LEV) -0.2048 0.4909 
    -0.367 -0.18 
  Firm Size (Ln(Assets)) -0.0015 0.0633 
    -0.959 -0.14 
  Adj R2 0.6512 0.3853 
  F-stat 137.1 4.2 
  N 949 67 
T-stats are reported in parentheses. --- indicates that social norm dummy variable is excluded from 
the regression since it was used to create the subsample of non-compliant firms.   
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6. Robustness Check 
As a robustness check, we use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and Linear 
regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to model our data. Both models 
confirm our findings of the influence of state ownership on dividends policy. Assuming 
that the disturbances are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), we fit the 
sample using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). This specification facilitates 
estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional 
correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. We also use Linear regression with 
panel-corrected standard errors where the disturbances are assumed to be either 
heteroskedastic across panels or heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated across 
panels. The disturbances may also be assumed to be autocorrelated within the panel, and 
the autocorrelation parameter may be constant across panels or different for each panel. 
Table 11 
Robustness Check: Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and Linear Regression with 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) 
 Model (7) DPSit=αt+β1tEPSit+β2tEPSit*GOVit +B3tDPSit-1+B4tDPSit-1 *GOVit+B5tGOVit   
+B6LEVit+B7tLn(Asset)it+εit 
  Variable FGLS  PCSE  
  Intercept 0.4450 0.4554 
    (0.022) (0.000) 
  EPS 0.2212 0.2312 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
  EPS*GOV 0.0082 -0.0032 
    (0.790) (0.906) 
  DPS 0.4201 0.4198 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
  DPS*GOV 0.2098 0.2089 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
 GOV -0.3762 -0.3775 
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  (0.001) (0.000) 
  LEV -0.2048 -0.2533 
    (0.367) (0.025) 
  Ln(Assets) -0.0015 -0.0005 
    (0.959) (0.953) 
  Model λ2  1784.97 4109.66 
 R2 ---- 0.6429 
  N 1,025 936 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ---- R2 of Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) usually 
is not reported. 
 
The two-robustness check models give similar results to what has been reported and 
discussed above. The GLS model gives similar results to those that have been reported 
before. Linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) requires common 
time periods to all panels to estimate the disturbance covariance matrix using case-wise 
inclusion. Therefore, we dropped some observations to have a balanced panel (89 
observation), and the model gives similar results to what has been reported and discussed 
above. 
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter examines how government ownership, board characteristics, and social 
norms affect payout policy. The board characteristics include board size, the frequency of 
meetings, the presence of independent directors, management share ownership, and major 
shareholder ownership. Using Saudi Arabian public firms’ annual reports from 2004 to 
2015, we specify seven hypotheses for the dividends ratio based on the relevant literature.  
This chapter provides new evidence of payout policy and corporate governance in 
a developing country. It also helps investors and finance professionals to recognize 
important firm characteristics in a market where government ownership is common and 
information asymmetry prevails. 
We separate the state from other major shareholders to measure the effect of state-
ownership on dividends policy. We find that dividends smoothing is common among 
Saudi firms and is more pronounced in SOEs. The state ownership increases the target 
payout ratio from 0.44 to 0.58 of the current earnings. We use a logit model to estimate 
the likelihood of paying dividends. We find that the current earnings and state ownership 
increase the likelihood of dividends payment. Dividends payment is more likely if the 
firm has paid dividends in the past.  
Among all board characteristics that are considered in this chapter, it seems that 
only two factors have a significant impact on the dividends decision: management share 
ownership and executive directors. For state-owned firms, dividends are expected to 
increase with the increase of top executives board members’ shares ownership. This 
relation holds only with SOEs. Therefore, the government may consider adding stock 
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options as compensation for its firms’ board members and top executives. For non-SOEs, 
dividends are expected to increase with more executives on the board. This finding holds 
with the full sample. Hence, the findings support the stewardship theory that encourages 
having more executives on the board to ensure an efficient functioning of the board. 
We study the effect of social norms on dividends policy. We use firms adhering to 
Islamic guidelines in investing and financing as a proxy for social norm. Our result shows 
the proxy of the social norm is insignificant. We attribute the result to the availability of 
conventional and Islamic-compliant debt instruments for firms within both the 
government and private sectors.  
We use year- and industry-fixed effects in our regressions, and as a robustness 
check, we use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and Linear regression with 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to model our data. Both models confirm our 
findings about the influence of state ownership on dividends policy. 
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8. APPENDIX B 
Table B.1 Variables Definition & Measurement (i=firm, t=year) 
Variable Variable Description Variable Definition 
DPS Dividends Per Share Dividends i,t / Common Share Outstanding i,t 
EPS Earnings Per Share Net Income i,t / Common Share Outstanding i,t 
DPSlag  One year lag of Dividends 
Per Share 
Dividends i,t-1 / Common Share Outstanding i,t-1 
GOV State Ownership Dummy variable equals 1 if the government 
own some share of Firm i,t  and zero otherwise 
GEPS  Interaction term 
Gov*eps 
The interaction term between State Ownership 
and Earnings Per Share. 
GDPSlag Interaction term 
Gov*dpslag 
The interaction term between State Ownership 
and One year lag of Dividends Per Share. 
NGOV Block shareholders Dummy variable equals 1 if some share of 
Firm i,t  are owned by Major Shareholder 
include Institution and Individual Investors. 
MOWND Management Ownership Dummy variable equals 1 if some share of 
Firm i,t  are owned of shares owned by 
executives and board member 
BSIZE Board Size Number of directors on the firm board i,t 
DUAL Chairman-CEO duality  Dummy, 1 if yes and zero otherwise 
INDEP Independent Directors Number of Independent Directors on Firm i,t 
Board of Directors 
INDEPR Independent Directors 
Ratio  
# of Independent Directors i,t / board size i,t 
EXEC Executive Directors Number of Executive Directors on Firm i,t 
Board of Directors 
EXECR Executive Directors Ratio  # of Executive Directors i,t / board size i,t 
BMET Board Meetings # of Annual Board Meetings i,t 
SIZE Firm Size Log(total Assets i,t) 
ROA Firm Performance Net Income i,t / Total Assets i,t 
TANG Tangible Assets  Fixed Assets i,t / Total Assets i,t 
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GROW Assets Growth  (total assets i,t – total assets i,t-1) / total assets i,t 
LEV Leverage Total Liability i,t / Total Assets i,t 
 
                                   
Table B.2 Correlation Matrix of Variables 
Panel A) Correlation of Dividends with Earnings, Previous Dividends, State Ownership, and Major Shareholders 
 dps eps dpslag gov ngov      
      
     
dps 1          
eps 0.6313 1         
dpslag 0.7356 0.5367 1        
gov 0.1856 0.2817 0.1571 1       
ngov -0.1325 -0.0795 -0.1062 -0.1202 1         
Panel B) Correlation of Dividends with Board Characteristics 
 DPS mownd bsize dual indep1 indepr excu1 excur bmet 
dps 1         
mownd 0.1267 1        
bsize 0.0025 0.0834 1       
dual -0.0194 0.0853 0.0624 1      
indep1 -0.0539 -0.0381 0.3118 -0.0371 1     
indepr -0.0788 -0.1012 -0.1951 -0.0835 0.852 1    
excu1 0.1238 0.0921 0.0844 0.2956 -0.1515 -0.212 1   
excur 0.1142 0.0636 -0.1677 0.2795 -0.2366 -0.185 0.9455 1  
bmet -0.0186 0.0444 -0.0188 -0.0085 0.0039 0.01 -0.1167 -0.0806 1 
Panel C) Correlation of Dividends with Control Variables (Debt-to-Assets Ratio, Firm Size, ROA, Tangible 
Assets) 
 dps dta lna roa fix     
dps 1         
dta -0.1487 1        
lna 0.1288 0.542 1       
roa 0.4954 -0.2048 0.1148 1      
Tang 0.0112 0.1814 0.6177 -0.0462 1     
 
Table B.3 Dividends Ratio Correlation Matrix of Variables Descriptive Statistic by year and 
Sate Ownership for Earnings and Dividends Per Share and Payout Ratio 
  
EPS: Earning Per 
Share 
DPS: Dividends Per 
Share 
POR: Payout Ratio 
year  0** 1* Total 0** 1* Total 0** 1* Tot 
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2004 Mean 0.94 4.08 2.47 1.05 2.86 1.93 2.10 0.87 1.50 
 
Std 
Dev 1.53 3.25 2.96 1.32 2.59 2.22 6.80 1.17 4.95 
 Obs 37 35 72 37 35 72 37 35 72 
           
2005 Mean 1.78 4.95 3.30 1.63 2.23 1.92 12.75 0.56 6.89 
 
Std 
Dev 2.54 4.15 3.74 2.26 2.47 2.37 76.89 0.94 
55.4
3 
 Obs 40 37 77 40 37 77 40 37 77 
           
2006 Mean 1.82 4.33 2.96 1.74 2.22 1.96 5.68 0.80 3.47 
 
Std 
Dev 3.10 2.96 3.27 1.85 2.43 2.13 29.27 1.62 
21.6
9 
 Obs 47 39 86 47 39 86 47 39 86 
           
2007 Mean 1.55 3.92 2.45 1.56 2.46 1.90 1.87 2.68 2.18 
 
Std 
Dev 2.80 3.29 3.20 2.29 2.64 2.46 8.84 11.68 9.98 
 Obs 68 42 110 68 42 110 68 42 110 
           
2008 Mean 1.03 3.06 1.77 1.02 1.73 1.28 2.03 0.85 1.60 
 
Std 
Dev 2.69 3.38 3.10 1.07 2.31 1.66 11.70 1.55 9.37 
 Obs 80 46 126 80 46 126 80 46 126 
           
2009 Mean 0.87 2.43 1.40 1.03 1.65 1.24 0.60 0.76 0.66 
 
Std 
Dev 2.22 2.46 2.41 1.24 2.04 1.58 6.60 0.95 5.36 
 Obs 88 46 134 88 46 134 88 46 134 
           
2010 Mean 0.93 2.91 1.57 0.94 1.79 1.21 1.30 0.75 1.12 
 
Std 
Dev 2.26 2.80 2.61 1.17 2.08 1.57 4.32 1.10 3.61 
 Obs 98 47 145 98 47 145 98 47 145 
           
2011 Mean 0.93 3.39 1.71 0.88 1.91 1.21 4.16 1.14 3.20 
 
Std 
Dev 2.39 3.21 2.91 1.00 2.32 1.61 36.66 4.30 
30.3
6 
 Obs 101 47 148 101 47 148 101 47 148 
           
2012 Mean 1.44 3.24 2.00 0.98 2.05 1.31 0.87 0.62 0.79 
 
Std 
Dev 2.19 2.86 2.55 1.15 2.19 1.62 3.22 0.70 2.69 
 Obs 106 48 154 106 48 154 106 48 154 
           
2013 Mean 0.91 3.14 1.59 0.99 2.06 1.32 0.87 0.71 0.82 
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Std 
Dev 2.50 3.04 2.86 1.26 2.25 1.70 3.65 0.91 3.08 
 Obs 110 49 159 110 49 159 110 49 159 
           
2014 Mean 1.36 3.13 1.91 0.98 1.88 1.26 4.80 0.57 3.48 
 
Std 
Dev 2.29 2.63 2.53 1.47 1.72 1.60 45.84 0.50 
38.0
5 
 Obs 113 51 164 113 51 164 113 51 164 
           
2015 Mean 1.22 2.84 1.72 0.76 1.74 1.06 0.37 0.54 0.42 
 
Std 
Dev 2.52 2.56 2.64 1.30 1.85 1.55 1.17 0.73 1.05 
 Obs 115 51 166 115 51 166 115 51 166 
           
Total Mean 1.18 3.38 1.95 1.05 2.02 1.39 2.51 0.89 1.94 
 
Std 
Dev 2.44 3.09 2.88 1.43 2.23 1.81 25.91 3.63 
21.0
3 
 Obs 1003 538 1541 1003 538 1541 1003 538 1541 
* 0 & 1 is government ownership dummy.      
**0 means that the government does not own any stock in a company 
 
 
Table B.4 Industry Classification 
Saudi Stock Market Industry Classification 
Code Industry 
1 Banks & Financial Services 
2 Petrochemical Industries 
3 Cement 
4 Retail 
5 Energy & Utilities 
6 Agriculture & Food Industries 
7 Telecommunication & Information Technology 
8 Multi-Investment 
9 Industrial Investment 
10 Building & Construction 
11 Real Estate Development 
12 Transport 
13 Media and Publishing 
14 Hotel & Tourism 
15 Insurance 
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Table B.5 Descriptive Statistic by Industry and Sate Ownership for Earnings and Dividends 
Per Share and Payout Ratio 
  
EPS: Earning Per 
Share 
DPS: Dividends Per 
Share 
POR: Payout Ratio 
Industry  0** 1* Total 0** 1* Total 0** 1* Total 
           
0 Mean 2.3 4.2 3.9 0.7 1.6 1.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
 Std Dev 3.9 2.6 3.0 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.5 0.3 0.7 
 Obs 25 104 129 25 104 129 25 104 129 
           
1 Mean 0.1 2.9 2.3 0.8 2.3 1.9 6.4 2.0 3.0 
 Std Dev 0.8 3.7 3.5 0.5 2.8 2.6 34.7 7.7 17.8 
 Obs 33 112 145 33 112 145 33 112 145 
           
2 Mean 0.8 5.1 4.2 1.1 3.9 3.4 1.5 0.9 1.0 
 Std Dev 0.6 2.1 2.6 1.1 2.5 2.5 3.8 1.0 1.9 
 Obs 24 96 120 24 96 120 24 96 120 
           
3 Mean 3.1 4.8 3.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.4 0.5 1.3 
 Std Dev 2.9 2.4 2.9 1.9 0.5 1.8 6.2 0.2 5.9 
 Obs 98 11 109 98 11 109 98 11 109 
           
4 Mean . 1.0 1.0 . 0.6 0.6 . 0.6 0.6 
 Std Dev . 0.8 0.8 . 0.6 0.6 . 0.4 0.4 
 Obs 0 24 24 0 24 24 0 24 24 
           
5 Mean 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.9 1.1 4.7 0.5 3.8 
 Std Dev 2.3 3.0 2.4 1.3 1.0 1.2 43.5 1.1 38.0 
 Obs 130 40 170 130 40 170 130 40 170 
           
6 Mean -1.7 4.5 1.9 0.5 1.7 1.2 -0.4 0.3 0.0 
 Std Dev 1.3 3.0 3.9 0.8 1.9 1.6 0.6 0.3 0.6 
 Obs 17 23 40 17 23 40 17 23 40 
           
7 Mean 0.7 . 0.7 1.3 . 1.3 7.9 . 7.9 
 Std Dev 2.4 . 2.4 2.1 . 2.1 42.1 . 42.1 
 Obs 79 0 79 79 0 79 79 0 79 
           
8 Mean 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.3 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.3 1.1 
 Std Dev 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.2 0.7 1.2 3.8 0.3 3.5 
 Obs 112 20 132 112 20 132 112 20 132 
           
9 Mean 1.8 3.8 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 4.8 0.4 3.7 
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 Std Dev 2.3 2.8 2.6 1.1 0.9 1.1 46.0 0.7 39.9 
 Obs 112 37 149 112 37 149 112 37 149 
           
10 Mean 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.6 1.1 
 Std Dev 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.8 1.2 4.3 0.8 3.7 
 Obs 59 19 78 59 19 78 59 19 78 
           
11 Mean 2.3 1.5 1.9 2.6 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.2 
 Std Dev 2.9 1.1 2.1 2.1 0.4 1.7 5.4 1.0 3.7 
 Obs 21 25 46 21 25 46 21 25 46 
           
12 Mean 0.8 . 0.8 1.4 . 1.4 -0.1 . -0.1 
 Std Dev 1.7 . 1.7 1.7 . 1.7 3.2 . 3.2 
 Obs 31 0 31 31 0 31 31 0 31 
           
13 Mean 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.2 1.4 4.1 0.8 2.8 
 Std Dev 3.3 1.2 2.6 1.5 0.3 1.2 13.3 0.4 10.3 
 Obs 18 12 30 18 12 30 18 12 30 
           
14 Mean -0.2 4.2 0.1 0.1 3.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 
 Std Dev 1.9 6.1 2.5 0.4 3.4 1.1 2.0 0.5 1.9 
 Obs 244 15 259 244 15 259 244 15 259 
           
Total Mean 1.2 3.4 2.0 1.1 2.0 1.4 2.5 0.9 1.9 
 Std Dev 2.4 3.1 2.9 1.4 2.2 1.8 25.9 3.6 21.0 
 Obs 1003 538 1541 1003 538 1541 1003 538 1541 
* 0 & 1 is government ownership dummy.        
**0 means that the government does not own any stock in a company 
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